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Monkey killing monkey killing monkey
Over pieces of the ground.
Silly monkeys give them thumbs,
They forge a blade,
And where there’s one
They’re bound to divide it,
Right in two.
— Manyard James Keenan,
Ohana means family.
Family means nobody gets left behind, or forgotten.
— Lilo & Stitch
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A B S T R A C T
The "smartization" of our world brings obvious benefits but it also
conveys great risks and an intelligent network for electricity distribu-
tion, as Smart Grid poses, needs a solid security infrastructure. The
Internet of Things has proven itself useful in many ways but at the
same time questionable security-wise, and the PRIME implementa-
tion of a Smart Grid infrastructure is no exception.
The intrusion and malicious control of an electrical system could
mean from the consumption reports being eavesdropped to perhaps
the electrical service for an entire building being cut off.
Following the study of the PRIME standard I will prove the exis-
tence of exploitable vulnerabilities in its most widespread implemen-
tation. Focusing on a Denial of Service attack design, these weak-
nesses will be shown dangerous when the attack is detailed for a
real-life scenario of the network.
With all this, I hope to shed light on some of the most critical points
concerning this implementation of a technology with still potential
for improvement as the Smart Grid itself.
R E S U M E N
La "smartización"de nuestro mundo trae consigo beneficios obvios
pero a su vez conlleva grandes riesgos y una red inteligente para dis-
tribución eléctrica, tal y como trae la Smart Grid, necesita una sólida
infraestructura de seguridad. El Internet de las Cosas ha demostra-
do ser útil pero al mismo tiempo cuestionable en lo respectivo a la
seguridad, y la implementación PRIME de Smart Grid no es una ex-
cepción.
Las intrusiones y el control malicioso de un sistema eléctrico podría
suponer desde el espionaje de informes de consumo hasta el corte de
suministro eléctrico de un edificio entero.
Siguiendo el estudio del estándar PRIME demostraré la existencia
de vulnerabilidades explotables en su versión más extendida. Cen-
trándome en el diseño de un ataque de Denegación de Servicio, estas
debilidades se tornarán peligrosas cuando el ataque quede detallado
en un escenario realista de la red
Con todo esto, espero arrojar luz sobre algunos de los puntos críti-
cos relativos a esta implementación de una tecnología con margen de
mejora como es Smart Grid.
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We have seen that computer programming is an art,
because it applies accumulated knowledge to the world,
because it requires skill and ingenuity, and especially
because it produces objects of beauty.
— Donald E. Knuth [9]
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This thesis is written with the goal of determining the security vul-
nerabilities of the PowerLine Intelligent Metering Evolution (PRIME)
protocol when faced with a Denial of Service (DoS) type of attack
and designing lines of attack needed to exploit the vulnerabilities
found along the way. PRIME is a Narrowband Power-Line Commu-
nications (NB-PLC) technology, with currently more than 19 million
deployed Smart Meters complying with it as of 2018, and likely to
expand worldwide in the foreseeable future. The PRIME Standard is
a creation of PRIME Alliance, led by the Spanish utility Iberdrola.
The total number of Smart Meters installed in Spain up to 2016’s
first semester reaches more than 17.5 million. This amount represents
62% of total existing meters at that point [1].
Another Spanish company, Gas Natural Fenosa, through its electric-
ity distribution subsidiary Unión Fenosa Distribución, finished 2014
with more than 1.26 million domestic smart meters installed and in-
tegrated into the remote management system. This figure represents
35.2% of the company’s domestic meter stock [1].
InovGrid (Portugal) is EDP Distribuicão’s umbrella project for Smart
Grids, pressing for increased energy efficiency. It has already in-
stalled 70k PLC PRIME meters within InovGrid’s project scope. Tar-
getted for 2015 was to reach an aggregated figure of 300k PLC PRIME
meters [20] [11].
Enega Operator, based in Poland, ordered the installation of Smart
Meters, with the deployment of 310,000 meters in progress. In Latin
America, Neoenergia is "testing PRIME as part of an Advanced Me-
tering field trial under real network conditions" [1] in Argentina and
Brazil.
"The new PRIME Smart Meters are a key element in the roll-out
of Smart Grids, which will open up new service possibilities to cus-
tomers in the near future. Thanks to these, the distribution companies
will be able to respond more quickly to customer requests for setting
up, modifying and cancelling contracts, reconnections and readings"
[1].
NB-PLC technologies are being widely employed in AMI’s last mile
thanks to the many advantages they present, such as the communi-
cations infrastructure being already deployed (electric cable), which
means deployment costs can be seriously reduced. In fact, according
to the Royal Decree 1110/2007 and the IET/290/2012, in Spain, 100%
of all domestic electrical management equipment must be "smart"
with telemetering capabilities by 2018. All of them use NB-PLC tech-
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2 introduction
nologies: approximately 50% (around 14M) uses Meters&More (En-
desa) and the other 50% uses PRIME (Iberdrola, Fenosa, EDP) [3].
1.1 motivation
Smart Cities are, without a doubt, a blooming concept with a vast
number of ideas flourishing around it, where Smart Grid infrastruc-
tures conform a crucial part of that concept. Focusing on Smart Grid
means focusing on a limited part of a greater technological vision but
without which that vision could never come to play.
Ever since the birth of the Internet of Things, key in the develop-
ment of tools to build Smart Cities, a long history of cyber-attacks
has been existing alongside it due to the lack of security-oriented de-
sign and abundance of vulnerabilities. These innovations are progres-
sively gaining weight and presenting themselves as firm candidates
for a great impact in the future days to come and therefore, security
needs to grow side by side with it to ensure this evolution.
Smart Meters and Concentrators are Critical Infrastructure [17] [7]
in the electrical network system and an attack on them poses a se-
rious threat to health, security and well-being of its citizens and cor-
rect functioning of its corresponding States. These vulnerabilities and
harsh history make Smart Grid infrastructure a potential victim for
ill-intentioned intruders [14] [6].
In order to bound the project, we will only focus the study on the
PRIME standard for Smart Grid networks and the implementation of
communication and logic mechanisms it brings to the table.
The PRIME Standard is the chosen one for several reasons. As
commented before, it is heavily based in the Spanish and European
context, hence presenting great closeness and propinquity to the de-
velopment of this work. As well as geographical reasons, the maturity
of its deployment in our environment is a positive point in its favor.
1.2 objectives
As commented, the objectives of the project are three well-defined
ones. First, it will focus on the study of the PRIME Standard and its
inner workings along the most recent versions.
After we have reached a deep understanding of the protocol used
for making the Smart Grid network work interconnected, we will go
on to analyze the risks it presents for its users and ways in which it
could be taken advantage of to cause clients harm.
The final step will be to precisely design the environment in which
a Denial of Service attack could take place in an infrastructure run-
ning on the PRIME Standard. Here it will be shown the requirements
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and most efficient plans to attack the network in the form of detailed
attack designs.
1.3 structure
The report has started with this introduction to the project, where
we have presented a brief entry point to the PRIME Standard environ-
ment, motivations for the analysis and study into the cybersecurity
aspect of the network protocol and communication.
Once we are comfortable with the scenario of the project, we will
carry out an explanation on how the PRIME Standard works in all its
aspects, including the elements present in the network, mechanisms
provided for registration, communications and consumption report
of its nodes, most important fields and security tools used in the
protocol.
The third part will consist in the in-depth analysis of the standard
from a security standpoint, intending to find every possible way an
attacker could exploit any of the elements. With this, we will exam-
ine limits, fields and ways of communication in which the different
elements have to send the number of messages needed for the correct
functioning of the service.
Here, the vulnerabilities will be shown according to their purpose,
first treating those usable by passively listening into the network and
obtaining info about it. Later, we will get into active territory, expand-
ing on those attacks requiring external network interference to work
and its potential uses. Finally, those security holes mentioned before
which best serve for a DoS attack will be developed for this purpose
in further detail.
The last part will consist on the development of the tools and frame-
work necessary to create the attacks which have greater potential to
deny service in a Smart Grid infrastructure. This will include detail-
ing the packet stream and context required for them to take place in
pseudo-real life system of these characteristics. We will cover differ-
ent effects for its various elements ranging from the Switch Nodes to
the end clients.
1.4 legal framework
One of the greatest obstacles in the way of Smart Grid’s evolution
and implementation is the creation of laws and energetic policies
adapted to the changes it presents in the electrical network system.
This technology presents the creation of new services and business
models and require an adequate framework for the control of its de-
velopment and the market surrounding it [4].
In the Spanish legislation, there is no specific law regulating the
use of Smart Grid technologies’ integration in the existing electric net-
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work but some that control specific aspects of its growth and imple-
mentation. Real decreto 1110/2007 ensures the definition of basic rights
and duties for different contexts regarding supply metering, as well
as quality of service control. Meanwhile Orden ITC/3860/2007 means
a replacement plan for old metering equipment, being substituted
by machines capable of telemanagement and time-frame decision by
December 31st 2018 [12] [21].
However, at european level, starting with the 2009/72/UE Directive,
the EU has provided principles, criteria and applicable techniques
to privacy-enforcement and data protection in the European Union.
Such measures include "data protection from design", Impact As-
sessment, "Best techniques available" standard and security measures
to help "Smart Grid providers improve the infrastructures’ cyber re-
silience" [5] [13].
These specific measures work alongside the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) framework, in place since May 2018, to en-
sure general protection and lack of undocumented use of user data.
1.5 socio-economic environment
Talking about a project concerning electrical infrastructure, it is
clear that a strong economic and environmental weight is being dealt
with. Analyzing potential vulnerabilities in a Smart Grid can avoid
the externally-forced malfunction of the system, hence avoiding seri-
ous damage and shortage of service. Furthermore, building a robust
protocol ensures all optimization techniques being developed can be
put in place securely, avoiding users overconsumption and thus push-
ing for a more intelligent use of the resources our environment pro-
vides.
A more optimal distribution of electric power is thought to provide
a service that doesn’t put so much pressure onto the working-class
consumers and economically fragile communities and contribute to
reducing the wealth gap. However, this service has to be kept shielded
from wrongdoers to maintain an ethical use of the system just how it
has been conceived, one reason more for this study to take place.
The risks conveyed in the misuse of this technology goes further
than individual users hijacking and manipulating their consumption
reports, against which the developers have built sufficient protection
mechanisms. Some of the greatest threats come from the case in
which an external malicious hand were to shut off electrical service
for an entire community. That is another reason why this thesis’ focus
is oriented to protect against Denial of Service attacks.
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1.6 budget
This thesis presents cyber-attack study and design as its milestone
and as such, requires no infrastructure to build or acquire tools that
would contribute to the increase in the budget.
The economic value of the equipment used spans the price of the
Mac Book Pro 2014 used in the writing and research of the thesis,
estimated around 2,100 €. Its weighted price, considering a duration
of approximately 9 months for the full development and planning of
this work, together with a depreciation for computer equipment of 6
years (according to Spain’s Tributary Agency [16]), would yield the
following:
2100 * 9months / (6 * 12) = 262.5 €.
Regarding the professional cost, the estimated value would contain
the following: ∼377 hours during the course of 8 months from a
Junior Engineer, with a value of around 12 €per hour, and around 24
hours employed by a Senior Engineer (Thesis supervisor), estimated
at 30 €per hour.
377h * 12€/h + 24h * 30€/h = 5244 €.
All of these values are referenced from this European benchmark
[19] for the IT and Cyber security field.
In total, this would add up to a professional cost of the engineering
labour of 5506.5 €.
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2
S TAT E O F T H E A RT
The following chapters will present the vulnerabilities and attack
procedures found in the study of the PRIME protocol, but first I will
set the background and scope of the thesis as well as the standardized
behavior under the PRIME Specification [8][15].
2.1 prime background
ITU-T accepted version 1.3.6 of the PRIME standard (Physical (PHY),
Media Access Control (MAC) and Convergence layers) and this is
the most common implementation in the majority of the Smart Grid
equipment deployed as of today. Version 1.4 was released when 2014
came to a close, but its implementation is not as widespread as its
predecessor.
A PRIME transmitter works as follows: PHY layer receives MAC
layer’s data, generating the PHY frame, also know as Physical Pro-
tocol Data Unit (PPDU). This frame is then convolutionally encoded,
scrambled in all occasions and interleaved [10].
new additions in version 1 .4 : V1.4 presents several changes,
among which we can highlight a higher data rate (130kbps max in
V1.3 –> 1028kbps max in V1.4) due to an extension to FCC and ARIB
bands and a "Robust mode" through the use of a "Repetition coder"
in the PHY layer, plus a longer Beacon discovery and an upgraded
Keep-Alive monitoring in the MAC layer.
Furthermore, this latest version presents some security fixes, en-
crypting some of the messages regarding communication between
Base and Terminal Nodes that, otherwise, travel in cleartext.
The new version of the standard, v1.4, presents too the inclusion
of new the new FCC and ARIB band, opening its use for the US and
Asia-Pacific markets.
Moreover, the new specification comes with the definition of sev-
eral changes in the MAC layer. These include the addition of link
quality information in the packet header, allowing to obtain such in-
formation in any given section of the network and further extending
the diagnosis capabilities for connectivity troubleshooting.
As one could expect, this new version also comes with backwards
compatibility mechanisms with version 1.3.6.
However, the dissemination of this latest version is not as broad
and hence the decision to focus this thesis on the previous 1.3.6 ver-
sion of PRIME. Just as we commented before, V1.3.6 is the current
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and most widespread standard for the momentum-winning NB-PLC
technologies’ implementation
2.2 scope
2.2.1 Physical Layer
The physical layer of an architecture deals with the transmission of
bits among the devices present in the network. Attacks on these levels
imply an attack on the type of modulation used to confuse or trick the
system into understanding an wrong message in a communication.
2.2.2 Media Access Control Layer
The MAC layer is responsible for privacy, authentication and in-
tegrity of the flowing data in PRIME, and together with the combina-
tion of the two Security Profiles provided by the standard, it adjusts
the encryption of the messages between nodes.
Security Profile 1 is used when encryption is needed, using the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bits algorithm and Electronic
CodeBook (ECB) block-cipher. Extended explanation on the usage of
Security Profiles will happen later in the chapter, in Section 2.3.2.
A cryptanalytic work of the AES implementation goes out of the
DoS-oriented focus of this thesis and therefore has no place in this
study.
The analysis of the key exchange between subnetworks and use of
Master Keys involves no injection of traffic and requires a mathemati-
cal dissection more than an strategy towards a Denial of Service.
As the MAC layer carries the security weight of the standard, its
functioning and inner mechanisms will conform the core of my PRIME
analysis, as I will further develop in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 Application Layer
At application layer, PRIME enables the use of DLMS/COSEM. To-
gether, they define a communication protocol to transmit energy-
related models and parameters. Additionally, DLMS comes with sev-
eral security upgrades that provide the systems with tools to strengthen
access control, message encryption and event logging.
However as interesting as this looks, this thesis will not go into
detail regarding the vulnerability analysis of the application layer as
its implementation is subject to change by any company who decides
to build it into their systems.
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2.3 prime standard : description
We now know PRIME is a NB-PLC technology whose aim is to
upgrade the communication between the DSO and the last mile of
AMIs (customers). The service aspires to provide application for the
following:
Improvement of quality control over the provided electrical cov-
erage.
Energy savings
Billing optimization and enhancements.
Remote control and measurements to the DSO.
Control over distributed energy sources’ generation, based mainly
on the effect of several renewable energies providing electricity.
Antifraud mechanisms and techniques.
Non technical losses detection
Demand response.
House automation (Smart Homes)
The variety in which the network of nodes in a Smart Grid infras-
tructure can be set up over different landscapes and topologies, where
little to no similarity can happen between a rural and an urban imple-
mentation. Wherever we may find a great density of nodes, element
such as data concentrators are needed to handle the vast number of
end-machines.
The communication between substations and management units
are mostly based on pre-existing technologies (IP), which makes for
both a more efficient use of infrastructure already in place and adap-
tation of existing security solutions.
PRIME consists of a physical (PHY), media access control (MAC)
and convergence layers, and have been accepted as standard by the
ITU-T in its 1.3.6 version.
2.3.1 Network elements
The PRIME specification describes that its Physical Layer (PHY)
operates in the CENELEC-A band (41-89 KHz) using OFDM modulation.
Carriers use DPSK, which enables up to 130 Kbps rates.
The Media Access Control (MAC) Layer consists of two different
type of nodes operating: Service Node (Terminal) and Base Node
(also referred to as Concentrator).
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Service Nodes are mostly the Smart Meters themselves, the end de-
vice, but can also adopt the function of a Switch when conditions
require it. As such, it assumes the two roles.
Switches act as repeaters, reducing the effect of signal attenuation.
On the other hand, Base Nodes deal with the management part of
the networking and coordinates communications. They are the Con-
centrators, and there is only a single one of them per network.
Service Node, while operating, can go through three different states:
Disconnected, Terminal and Switch. The interaction and evolution
from one state to another can be seen in the following Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Service Node state diagram
The PRIME Specification leaves a gap open when deciding the most
favorable Node to promote up to Switch, not defining how the deci-
sion is best executed. External studies have taken place, concerned
with the optimization of the path cost of information sent by the
nodes and "enhancement of the algorithm’s accomplishments" [2].
The goal clearly is to propose an algorithm in order to find the node
providing for the optimal performance within the network, minimiz-
ing the time application layers exchange information.
Nodes count with several identification fields in PRIME, that serve
diverse purposes of the addressing in each context, as shown in Ta-
ble 2.1. Interaction between these fields will be seen in Figure 2.7,
later in the Chapter.
MAC Layer frames contain several types of message, each encapsu-
lating a different kind of information. As most modern communica-
tion protocols, counts with a Header indicating, among other things,
the type of packet in question. Each type is described below in Ta-
ble 2.2 and will be seen in greater detail in the upcoming Section 2.4.
At the same time, Generic Control Packets encapsulates several
types of packet types, shown in Table 2.3 below and will be covered
further in Section 2.4.1.
2.3.2 Security Aspects
MAC Layer is in charge of all aspects of PRIME dealing with confi-
dentiality, authentication and integrity over the communications. For
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name lenght description / function
Extended Unique
Identifier
48 bits MAC Address. As there is a single Base
Node per network, its EUI-48 is used as a
subnet identifier for the whole BN. This
address is also known as the Subnetwork
Address (SNA).
Switch Identifier 8 bits SID identifies a Switch within the net-
work. When a promotion occurs, the
Base Node dynamically assigns the SID to
the promoted Service Node. Base Nodes
have SID = 0 by default.
Local Node Identi-
fier
14 bits LNID identifies a specific node in the net-
work. Assigned by the Base Node upon
registration in its subnetwork.
Local Connection
Identifier
9 bits LCID identifies a connection between a
node pair.
Table 2.1: ID Fields in PRIME Nodes
Figure 2.2: Frame Hierarchy diagram
this purpose, the main tool is the use of what it is denoted as Security
Profiles, where two different ones exist:
Security Profile 0 doesn’t rely on encryption nor provides data
integrity or private authentication.
Security Profile 1 is the most secure of the two, where we can
find these three services. For encryption, this Profile uses Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-bit keys and Elec-
tronic Codebook (ECB) as block cypher. Regarding integrity,
encryption of the desired data together with its Cyclic Redun-
dancy Check (CRC) is the chosen option.
These two Security Profiles are negotiated between the parties in-
volved, (Base and Service Nodes) when exchanging messages. How-
ever packets of the following types do not use Security Profile nego-
tiation due to the nature of their respective use: PNPDU, BPDU, REG
and SEC messages.
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name sender use
Beacon PDU
(HDR.HT=2)
Base
Node /
Switch
Publish own address for Service Nodes
to find it and register to. Broadcast func-
tionality occurs through Beacons for syn-
chronization purposes.
Promotion
Needed PDU:
(HDR.HT=1)
Service
Node
Upon suffering from connection loss (no
Beacon PDU received), used to alert
nearby nodes of this situation. When
other node (Terminal) receives a PNPDU,
requests its Base Node for Switch promo-
tion in order to provide the connection-
less node with service again. As a Ser-
vice Node sends a request for promo-
tion triggered by a previous PNPDU, it
attaches a PNA. This ensures the Base
Node does not promote several Termi-
nals to provide service for the same dis-
connected node.
Generic
MAC PDU:
(HDR.HT=0)
All nodes Generic packets, consist of Control pack-
ets (PKT.C=1): network management, and
Data packets (PKT.C=0): transmission of in-
formation.
Table 2.2: Packet Types in PRIME
Security Profile Negotiation takes place during device registration
to the Base Node, where a REG_REQ message is sent from the Service
Node with the proposed value for the profile. This value is contained
in the REG.SPC field, and is considered by the receiving Base Node.
It can then accept the requested Profile, in which case it will send a
REG_RSP keeping that same REG.SPC value back to the Node, down-
grade the Profile, setting REG.SPC=0 or directly reject the connection
if the proposal is not enough.
2.3.3 Encryption
Security Profile 1 is the designed context for encryption to take
place, where for each packet encrypted in this mode the Secure CRC
(SCRC) is computed. Computation works over the unencrypted packet
payload, by dividing modulo 2 the generator polynomial g(x) = x8 + x2
+ x + 1 and the polynomial x8, then taking the remainder. This re-
mainder is multiplied with the unencrypted payload to execute the
operation.
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name packet code
Registration Management (REG) PKT.CTYPE = 1
Connection Management (CON) PKT.CTYPE = 2
Promotion Management (PRO) PKT.CTYPE = 3
Beacon Slot Indication (BSI) PKT.CTYPE = 4
Frame Structure Change (FRA) PKT.CTYPE = 5
CFP Request (CFP) PKT.CTYPE = 6
Keep-Alive (ALV) PKT.CTYPE = 7
Multicast Management (MUL) PKT.CTYPE = 8
PHY Robustness Management (PRM) PKT.CTYPE = 9
Security Information (SEC) PKT.CTYPE = 10
Table 2.3: Generic Packet Types
AES is the chosen mechanism to encrypt 128-bit blocks using a
valid working key. The packet sees the subtraction of its Header and
only the Clear packet payload, SCRC and "10..PAD" remain to act
as "data to encrypt". This data then goes through AES encryption
procedure.
2.3.4 Key Hierarchy
The PRIME Specification defines a series of keys it uses in its en-
cryption processes, described below:
Unique Secret Key (USK): Used to derive WK0 and WK.
USK = AESenc(DSK, KDIV)
Initial Working Key (WK0): Used by Service Node in disconnec-
tion state to decrypt some fields of REG_RSP message.
WK0 = AESenc(USK,0)
Working Key (WK): Used for encryption of all unicast data be-
tween Base and Service Nodes. Varies with each Service Node.
WK = AESenc(USK, SEC.RAN), SEC.RAN being the random se-
quence received in the field of the same name.
Subnetwork Working Key (SWK): Used for broad/multicasting
data or direct communications with the Base Node not involved.
Never transmitted over physical channel, computed from other
keys.
SWK = AESenc(SNK, SEC.SNK), SEC.SNK being the random se-
quence received in the field of the same name.
WK and SKW updated each MACRandSeqChgTime seconds.
[ September 25, 2018 at 1:37 – classicthesis version 3.0 ]
14 state of the art
Master Keys 1 & 2 (MK1, MK2): Administered by the Base Node
and used to derive other keys. Administration of these keys is
not defined in the PRIME Standard.
Device Secret Key (DSK): Unique to each Service Node, hard-
coded in the device at production time.
DSK = AESenc(MK1, UI), UI being the EUI-48 of the device.
Key Diversifier(KDIV): Unique to each Service Node but not con-
stant for the entire lifetime of the device. Provision of the key
to the Node is not of the scope of the PRIME Standard.
KDIV = AESenc(MK2, UI), UI being the EUI-48 of the device.
2.4 mac pdu format
This section will be dedicated to the explanation of the structure of
the MAC PDU and some of its most relevant types in this work in
order to ease the explanation of the attack implementations to come
in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 Generic MAC PDU format
Different types of MAC PDUs serve different purposes, but most of
the Subnetwork traffic in a PRIME network consists of Generic MAC
PDU (GPDU)s. All Control packets and Data traffic are comprised in
GPDUs.
Figure 2.3 shows how the GPDU is "composed of a Generic MAC
Header followed by one or more MAC packets and 32 bit CRC ap-
pended at the end" [8].
Figure 2.3: Generic MAC PDU Format
Consists of a size of 3 bytes, its format is represented in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Generic MAC Header
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Inside one of the multiple packets a GPDU can carry after its header,
the structure that can be found is what it can be seen in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Packet structure
MAC Packet’s header has a length of 6 bytes and it is composed of
the elements seen in Figure 2.6
Figure 2.6: MAC Packet header
In the packet fields we can find two remarkable values: PKT.LNID
(14 bits) and PKT.SID (8 bits). These two values, together, conform
what is known as the NID of a Node, PKT.NID in the header. The
figure also contains a reference to the field PKT.LCID (9 bits), Local
Connection Identifier (LCID), which also composes the PKT.CID when
joined with the NID. The whole scheme is shown in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: PKT.CID structure
2.4.2 Beacon MAC PDU format
Beacons are a mechanism of the standard meant for broadcasting
Switch and Base Node’s information to potential connecting nodes
around, working through the use of the Beacon PDU (BPDU). Its func-
tion is "to circulate information on MAC frame structure and there-
fore channel access to all devices that are part of this Subnetwork"
[8].
The transmission of the BPDU is periodic (every (MACFrameLength
- MACBeaconLength) symbols), and can be used by Service Nodes as
a synchronization tool. Beacons always have a length of MACBea-
conLength symbols long [8]. Its complete structure can be seen in
Figure 2.8.
[ September 25, 2018 at 1:37 – classicthesis version 3.0 ]
16 state of the art
Figure 2.8: Beacon PDU Packet
Another function the Beacon PDU is given is providing Terminals
with capability to detect if their corresponding Uplink Switch has
stopped being available, be it because external change in the condi-
tions of the medium or directly device failure. Switch unavailability
is activated if a Service Node does not receive Nmiss-beacon BPDUs in
a row, when the link unusable. In doing so, all logical relationships
with that Switch are completely shut off: closes all active MAC con-
nections, unregisters from it and even stops sending BPDUs down-
wards if it was acting as a Switch itself.
2.4.3 MAC CRC
For both the GPDU and BPDU, the last field in the packet is a 32-bit
CRC, used to detect transmission errors as usual. Its computation
involves the complete PDU except for the CRC value itself.
The CRC operation consists of several elements, similarly to the
SCRC seen in the previous subsection. The first of which would be
the Generator Polynomial: G(x) = x32 + x26 + x23 + x22 + x16 + x12 +
x11 + x10 + x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x + 1. Then, the input polyno-
mial’s coefficients are derived from the data being checked. The data
bits themselves conform the coefficients in reading order, i.e. highest
coefficient is assigned to the first read bit.
Finally, the remainder R(x) is computed, and its coefficients will
serve as the final CRC value. Such remainder is obtained from the
division of (M(x) * x32) / G(x).
2.4.3.1 Header Check Sequence
This is a field appearing at the end of GPDUs, whose calculation
involve the CRC of SNA || first 2Bytes of Header (|| meaning con-
catenation). This CRC is computed in a similar way to the Secure
CRC (SCRC) commented in the previous section: "remainder of the
division modulo 2 of the polynomial M(x)*x8 by the generator polyno-
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mial textitg(x) = x8 + x2 + x + 1" [8]. In this operation, M(x) acts as
input and it is precisely equal to SNA || first 2Bytes of Header. The
MSB of this sequence will correspond to the highest coefficient in this
input.
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P R O T O C O L V U L N E R A B I L I T Y A N A LY S I S
Before any action to be taken towards a Smart Grid network, it is
needed to thoughtfully analyze the protocol [8] used by this system
and carry out an extensive planning on how could we attack PRIME
[15].
First, we will study what are the possibilities to passively work on
the inspection of the protocol, listening to the network’s traffic and
determining what information can be yielded by the nodes belonging
to a Smart Grid system.
After that, we will start to take action via an active attack of traffic
injection, through which we can effectively intervene on the network.
Here we can evaluate what is the nature of the packets that are in
our best interest to be introduced to obtain the greatest amount of
information possible back from the system in question.
Finally, based on a more extensive knowledge of PRIME we will
be in position to understand what aspects of it are more prone to
suffering a Denial of Service attack (DoS) over this infrastructure.
3.1 passive attack : reconnaissance
As commented before, first our objective is to go over the possi-
bilities of carrying out a passive attack in which we sniff into the
network’s traffic. In this phase we will not yet consider the option of
inserting packets in the system but just passive listening. The objec-
tive of this eavesdropping is to determine the biggest amount of in-
formation about the network, learning the number of nodes present,
each of their types and how much we can learn about them separately
by the data they transmit.
3.1.1 Physical Layer
It is commented before how the physical layer is in charge of bit-
level transmission between machines and their physical interfaces.
Unfortunately, the only attack considered in this thesis focusing on
this first layer is physical layer jamming and cannot be considered as
of passive nature. Therefore, this layer presents no interest from the
point of view of this section but will be studied later.
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3.1.2 Media Access Control Layer
sniffing : By the connection of a sniffer device in one of the ele-
ments of the network using Security Profile 0, an attacker could
be able to gain access to all traffic flowing through it. This
means that strategically, someone who wished to gain access
to the biggest amount of critical information would aim for a
heavily connected piece of equipment like a Base Node.
If we connected a sniffer on a topologically inferior element,
only the information regarding the very last few Service Nodes
after that would be readable by us. Hence a Base Node stands
as a more interesting alternative.
Once connected, if the upper-layer traffic is unencrypted, de-
tailed analysis could be carried out onto the data transmitted to
find mostly two types of information:
NID information about each node and its associated EUI-
48 through the study of connection requests to the Base
Node under attack.
Transmission of critical information, such as consumption
reports and other private data.
This whole scenario depends on the use of an specific configura-
tion regarding the Security Profiles provided by PRIME. How-
ever, regardless of which one is used, they all lack Perfect For-
ward Secrecy. This means that if a strong attack were to be
launched upon the keys for them to be compromised and suc-
ceeded, it would reveal past information captured earlier (en-
crypted at the time). Documented in [18] we can find some
past successful attempts on key-compromising attacks at Ser-
vice Nodes. It will not be covered here as it is out of the scope
of this thesis.
Rather than an active intrusion in the network traffic, the sniff-
ing technique opts for a more stealthy alternative, focusing on
the capture of flowing information, harming the privacy of the
service’s users.
3.2 active attack : traffic injection
3.2.1 Physical Layer
As it is common with communication protocols of diverse natures,
the physical layer is tasked with the transmission of information at
bit level, connecting the physical elements in the devices belonging
to the network (i.e. interfaces).
This physical layer works with the symbol transmission through
the network. Here, the most common type of attack is that of block-
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ing or interfering existing communications, known as jamming. This
jamming consists on transmitting signals onto the channel to disrupt
the message transmission by decreasing the Signal-to-Noise ratio.
PRIME uses OFDM-PSK as a modulation technique and, for it, a
jamming attack can be carried out using different type of signals to
interfere in the communication:
noise jamming : is the name give to the introduction of noise in the
system and conforms the simplest option for signal jamming.
Generally, Gaussian noise is employed and it can be used to
cover the bandwidth totally or just partially.
interference jamming : is now based on the usage of colored
signals not in synchronization to the signal we are to target.
correlated jamming : is the most effective against the specific
type of modulation used by the standard but requires synchro-
nization and profound knowledge of the target signal.
Apart from correlation jamming – which, on the other hand, presents
higher demands to be done effectively – the OFDM modulation used
in PRIME is robust against noise, which obviously reduces the suc-
cess expectancy of a noise or interference jamming.
An attack on Service Nodes would not be the most effective as
the dynamic topology of the network in PRIME allows for its recov-
ery when a number of switches and Service Nodes are taken down,
whereas an attack on a Base Node presents a very different scenario.
If one of these nodes is affected by a successful jamming attack, the
network would be put at serious risk.
Regardless of the method employed, a jamming attack would re-
quire physical access to the channel and even though a protection
of the Base Node usually takes place in PRIME real-life implementa-
tions, protecting Service Nodes is a tougher challenge. They are usu-
ally the previous piece to the client’s power station and protecting
every link with the Service node requires a major economic invest-
ment.
This is the reason why jamming attacks are more interesting from a
wireless point-of-view, as the air being used as the transmission chan-
nel makes the "physical access" to the communication infrastructure
trivial. However, we will leave jamming attacks to the side when exe-
cuting an attack and focus more on packet injection to the MAC Layer
after an intensive passive sniffing of the ongoing traffic and enough
information has been extracted.
3.2.2 Media Access Control Layer
As we have seen, PRIME MAC frames are divided into three types:
Beacon PDU, Promotion Needed PDU and Generic MAC frames; de-
pending on what does the MAC Header determine.
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promotion needed flooding : Promotion needed PDU is a packet
meant for when a Service Node acting as a Terminal wants to
move up and become a Switch, so then it uses this PNPDU to
alert nearby nodes of this intention. When others Terminals in
its surroundings receive this frame, they alert the Base Node to
request a Switch promotion: Promotion Request message which
includes the Promotion Needed Address (PNA) to identify the
requesting node. This mechanism also prevents the Base Node
from processing two promotions coming originally from the
same Terminal Node.
However, the standard does not include any tool or criteria to
decide which node should be promoted, which could lead to
problems for the system.
One could modify a Promotion Request message changing its
PNA, which would lead to confusion in the network as the Base
Node would promote a different node than the one who re-
quested such promotion. Furthermore, if the network were sub-
jected to injection of a forged Promotion Request when another
request is generated by a real node, this could result in a com-
petition between several Service Nodes. Such situation could
lead to a shortage of service. In this strategy, an attacker could
spoof PNPDUs from forged EUI-48 addresses to generate negative
results:
PNPDUs are meant for Nodes with poor communication with
the Base node and hence no encryption can take place between
them, leaving these messages unencrypted in all Security Pro-
files. This makes for an interesting vulnerability as it spans all
networks.
The number of PNPDUs flowing in the system is recommended
to be time-limited to avoid total flood, but a dense traffic of
this type would severely affect legitimate requests of real nodes
experiencing connectivity problems. The potential effects and
dangers of this attack will be further explored in the next part,
Section 3.3, as they might cause a severe shortage of service.
lsid overflow : Again, this approach exploits the relay system in
PRIME for nodes lacking quality connection with the Base Node.
Now, an attacker could set up multiple rogue Service Nodes
and craft promotion requests to Switch in the topology.
The maximum number of Switches in the network is defined
by its identification with the Base, for which the Local Switch
Identifier (LSID) is used. It is an 8-bit value, thus conforming up
to 256 different possibilities for Switch identification.
When this limit number of Switches is reached in the network,
it is up to the Base Node to decide wether to block new requests
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or start assigning new positions getting rid of the oldest entries
in the registry. For the Promotion Requests to go though as
valid, the PNAs must differ from those used previously to trick
the Base Node into taking them in as new Switches, what leads
to great noise in the network for the attack to take place.
registration overflow : When a new node wants to register onto
a network, they establish a communication with its correspond-
ing Base Node. Here, they use their EUI-48 address as identifi-
cation to obtain what is called a Node Identifier (NID), unique in
the network. This NID is a 22-bit identification value made up
of two parts: Switch ID (SID, 8 bits) and Local Node Identifier
(LNID, 14 bits), as previously seen in Figure 2.7.
It is worth mentioning that this LNID is referred to a Switch so
it is unique for each node connected to it. With all this in mind,
the maximum number of identifiers goes only as high as 16384
IDs for a single switch (nodes potentially registered).
This registration poses a risk for the network, as an attacker
could forge this Registration Requests by selecting an SID to
use in the connection (this being an alternative option, rather
than letting the switch select it). This might be the preferred
alternative as in real networks, the number of switches is gener-
ally limited, allowing us to narrow down the attack.
If the attacker spoofs these requests using EUI-48 IDs, in pseudo-
random fashion, it could end up exhausting the LNID space for
valid identifiers, focusing on the most critical switches in the
network (i.e. targeting their corresponding SIDs).
Under this situation, should a real working node get discon-
nected from the network or suffer from a loss of connection, it
would find itself unable to become part of its former topology
again. There would be no available LNID for it to use with that
Switch until the timeout has run out. This attack presents se-
rious problems for a working network and will be analyzed in
further detail in the next section, 3.3.
node registration spoofing : When a node wants to connect to
a network, a registration request is sent with its EUI-48. How-
ever if that node happens to be already registered and its Iden-
tifier, the standard presents no guideline on what to do.
Clearly, in this case, only two outcomes can be expected: rejec-
tion or reassignment. In the first case, not until that registered
node is unregistered and its EUI is out of the Base Node’s list
will the requesting Service Node be able to enter. Alternatively,
the Base Node could decide to accept that request and assign a
new NID (there cannot be reused NIDs until timeout).
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This, of course, presents several ways of exploitation. (1) Rejec-
tion: As an attacker, one could spoof the victim node’s EUI-48,
a Service Node, and register with it in the network so when
the legitimate node attempted to do the same, it would not be
allowed access.
(2) Acceptance with new NID: As seen before, spoofing a EUI-
48 address and request registration with it. This Identification
would belong to an existing and working Service Node, and
when the attacker creates this (second) request for the same
EUI, the corresponding Base Node would assign it a new NID
to which it will send all further messages. Of course, the at-
tacker would carry out the request through a different SID so
the victim is no longer sent the response and future messages
This attack would leave a legitimate Service Node with no con-
nection to the network if its identification is spoofed, causing
Denial of Service in the long run for the system.
base node spoofing : According to the specification, there can only
be ONE single Base Node per network, so any interfering Base
Node Beacons would severely disturb the behavior of a func-
tioning network.
If an attacker were to gain physical access to the infrastructure
at play, could connect a rogue Base Node so nearby Service
Nodes would receive its Beacons and potentially request con-
nection to it. Once they are connected to the attacker’s BN, Ser-
vice Nodes would stop receiving real data and lose connection
to the outside network.
According to the standard, it is the Service Node who is in
charge of communicating its supported Security Profiles when
establishing the connection to the Base Node. Then, the BN
either accepts that Profile or decides to downgrade it to an un-
protected context. If the chosen is Security Profile 0 it means
the Base Node has been able to establish a connection in low-
protection conditions even if the Service Node supported a pro-
tected Profile 1, effectively hijacking its function. The use of this
method will be discussed in the next section, 3.3.1
disconnection spoofing : Getting one node element off the net-
work works in a way similar to the mechanism previously ex-
plained in the previous attack. Now we will work with demo-
tion of switches, unregistration and finally disconnection.
These actions can have a variety of origins. A Service Node can
initiate the process through a request message (REG_UNR_S /
PRO_DEM_S / CON_CLS_S; unregistration, demotion and dis-
connection respectively), and is answered through an acknowl-
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edge. Alternatively, a Base Node can take over the initiation of
the process (REG_UNR_B / PRO_DEM_B / CON_CLS_B).
Sniffing here can be a useful tool to find suitable targets (LNID/
SID/ LCID) and later spoof a message from the Base Node re-
questing Unreg/Demot/Discon towards that target. That Ser-
vice Node will then, as explained before, acknowledge the re-
quest. However this ACK would be received by a Base Node
who hasn’t really sent any request in the first place, but any-
how interprets that SN’s response serves as a proper request,
for which it will then proceed to send a message to be acknowl-
edged again by the Service Node. As expected by a now, un-
wanted, message through the SN’s eyes, it will be discarded.
This process results in an action being finally acknowledged
and executed by both parties involved while none really request-
ing it. The misunderstanding between devices would unavoid-
ably lead to an unregistration, demotion or disconnection of a
Service Node, causing potential DoS. Further implications will
be discussed in the next section.
replay attack : This mechanism conforms one of the classic at-
tacks on network infrastructures and consists on the manipu-
lation of traffic to be resent and repeat the action that data ex-
ecuted. A previous and necessary step for it to happen is the
examination (eavesdropping) of a channel until valuable and us-
able traffic comes through and has the potential to be used for
the attack.
In the PRIME Standard, a replay attack can take place when
using Security Profile 0 and facing a lack of anti-replay mecha-
nisms in the upper layers. Captured traffic then will have to go
through a change in its Local Connection Identifier (LCID) to
the desired one for it to be used (assuming an already working
connection).
Through this mechanism, we can replay traffic originally meant
for a Service Node in another. We would need to change the
LNID, SID (and LCID) for it to be accepted by the victim node.
The use of Security Profile 1 in this situation would toughen
the attacker’s job by making cryptoanalysis necessary to diluci-
date wether a packet is interesting or not. However, headers are
not encrypted nor integrity-protected by Security Profile 1. This
means header fields (for instance, LCID) can be modified at will,
but CRC needs to be recomputed for every change made to the
packet. This security profile poses severe problems for anyone
attempting an attack of this sort, as there’s another restriction
to be faced: WK are device and session specific, meaning that
only traffic from the same device in the same time span (while
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registered and using that WK) can be replayed. As seen, Secu-
rity Profile 1 noticeably reduces the attack’s scope for one with
the aforementioned characteristics.
security crc : Integrity protection is provided by this SCRC in the
Security Profile 1. It uses the unencrypted packet payload for it
to be computed and gets encrypted for transmission, whereas
standard CRC comes unencrypted.
For a receiver to consume a packet, first has to check the CRC in
the header, decrypt and lastly check the SCRC. An attacker can
make use of this by attaching an encrypted payload for which
its key is unknown to a valid header and CRC. As a result, every
receiving node has to check CRC and decrypt a packet before it
can detect its content is forged, facing intense use of resources
in the process, while an attacker having very low computational
power needed.
The attack scope and effect depends on the victim, as a Ser-
vice Node suffering from resource exhaustion would leave just
a client disconnected and off the network, but a Base Node un-
der attack would mean a loss of service for the whole network
while kept busy enough.
Modern PRIME chipsets now come with AES crypto modules
that ease the workload on the main node processor by pre-
computation of the CRCs, resulting on a lower impact, leaving
the attack few room for damage.
3.3 active attack : denial of service
3.3.1 MAC Layer
We have seen the Media Access Control Layer dealing with the log-
ical heavyweight action of the protocol, including addressing, Switch
and Node registration management, channel access, security and the
logical topology itself. Aforementioned attacks have been studied for
this layers where it shows potential vulnerabilities and now it is time
to plan how these could be exploited to achieve the desired Denial of
Service in the system.
promotion needed flooding : Abuse of the PNPDU mechanism
can be done by spoofing of the requests. When a Base Node
receives multiple Promotion Requests from nodes apparently
lacking connectivity, it makes use of its tools to prevent it. This
means, the BN falls into the trap of enabling all those node to be-
come Switches when, in reality, their situation was completely
normal.
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Through this attack, a malicious operator could downgrade the
communication quality with bigger delays, operation errors...
The communication would not be completely blocked but no-
ticeably hindered.
Any of the Security Profiles provides encryption protection to
PNPDU messages, so every network running PRIME is sub-
jected to this potential harm.
For each PNPDU generated by a requesting node, several are
forwarded to the closest Base Nodes by other nodes neighbor-
ing the requester. This leads to an amplification of the traffic,
which, if used in a spoofing attack could lead to a traffic over-
load to that Base Node.
To solve a connectivity problem, the Base Node would grant a
node the Switch state. However, if this Base Node receives Pro-
motion Requests from apparently many, if not all, nodes in the
network it could result in an enormous growth in the topologi-
cal complexity of the net.
Promotion Needed requests always include the address of the
node to be promoted, should the Base Node agree to do so.
This is referred to as PNA in order for the Base Node to man-
age and potentially evaluate requests. This attack means that
the Base Node will be confronted with the majority of its asso-
ciated nodes apparently lacking quality connectivity and likely
accepting most requests to promote them into Switches.
No way is available to avoid traffic amplification as described
previously, only a limit in the number of PNPDUs received in
a time span. This offers limited protection; an inadequate inter-
val would worsen the functioning of the network affecting legit-
imate nodes too. On the other hand, some protective measures
can be taken against Switch Promotion requests’ dramatical in-
crease in number. Base Node firmware modifications can be
executed to select the PNAs capable of being promoted and ig-
noring those request coming from other addresses already reg-
istered.
Putting these facts to practice would result in a noisy network,
PNPDU packets being more and more frequent until the net-
work faces congestion, and a growing number of Terminal Nodes
turning into Switches, overcomplicating the logical topology of
the communications. As a result this will be one of the attack
mechanisms to consider in the next part for the implementation
of attack designs, Chapter 4.
node registration overflow : This attack would occur in the
scenario of a wide group of malicious nodes requested connec-
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tion to a Base Node and ended up exhausting the registration
space available for legitimate ones.
Denial of Service takes place when real working nodes attempt
to register onto one of these Base Nodes and find themselves
unable to do so for the LNID table in those BN is already full
and is forced to leave them out. The most obvious and interest-
ing objective for the attack would be to interfere with the most
critical elements in the topology. In order to maintain ease of in-
teraction with nodes connecting with the first time or newcom-
ers to the network, PRIME specification keeps the registration
messages unencrypted in all Security Profiles. However, if the
intention is, as the case with our malicious nodes is, to complete
such registration, it will be needed to comply with the Profile
being used in that segment of the network. Clearly, a much
easier task if SecProf 0 is being used.
It is worth mentioning the noisiness of this attack, as the gen-
erated traffic in order to exhaust the registration table entries
has to be relatively massive. This adds to the fact that PRIME
networks operate over a dynamic logic and nodes are rarely
added to an already working network. Therefore, systems run-
ning a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) could have
a higher probability of successful defense against this situation.
If this attack were to take place, and a legitimate node attempted
to connect to the affected switch would not be able to do so for,
at least, an specified timeout established in the standard.
lnid timeout : The specification dictates that when a Base
Node needs to use a LNID, it shall not choose a value for the
LNID recently released by an unregistration process. The exact
time needed to go by before the use of that value would be the
following: (macMaxCtlReTx +1) * macCtlReTxTimer seconds [8].
macMaxCtlReTx corresponds to the "maximum number of times
a MAC entity will try to retransmit an unacknowledged MAC
packet".
macCtlReTxTimer corresponds to "the number of seconds for
which a MAC entity waits for acknowledgement of receipt of
the MAC packet from its peer entity" [15].
The goal of this mechanism is to make sure retransmission pack-
ets have safely left the subnetwork and will not be mistakenly
redirected to the new node, using that unregistered LNID.
In a similar manner, a Base Node shall not reuse a recently
freed LNID. Freeing happens through the Keep-Alive process
and reuse needs to wait until Tkeep_alive seconds have passed.
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For this, the standard uses the largest value between the last
acknowledged Tkeep_alive value and the last unacknowledged T
keep_alive, for the Service Node receiving that LNID value.
With all of this in mind, we can now see how under this at-
tack, the network would not be able to assign a new LNID if a
node were to disconnect or lose connectivity. Free LNID values
would not be available under the affected SIDs for, at least, this
timeout.
However, the behavior of the Base Node regarding this exhaus-
tion of LNIDs for a switch is not specified, so the actions it took
would depend on the specific implementation.
node registration spoofing : PRIME specifications fails to de-
termine how to handle registration requests from already reg-
istered IDs, and it can either reject the registration or accept it,
assigning a new NID.
It was commented before the situations to which each behavior
leads to regarding security concerns and ways in which both
can be exploited with malicious purposes. Although registra-
tion rejection can be undesirable (registering all LNIDs and leav-
ing legitimate nodes out at registration time), it has not nearly
the potential danger conveyed in the ’node impersonation’ that
the second behavior conforms, as it would mean the rogue node
will act and receive communication in the name of the victim
node.
In order to chose a victim and obtain its EUI-48, a simple sniff-
ing would be enough to learn this kind of data as it travels
unencrypted to a listener sitting in the middle of a registration
request communication, as we do not count on physical access
to the nodes to obtain it.
We have seen in the case above that when a node stands in the
place of a legitimate node previously there, it has to keep up
with the security specifications established with the Base Node
until the registration process is complete.
lsid overflow : The Local Switch Identifier Overflow consisted on
creating functioning Switches in the network. Through this be-
havior, an attacker would attempt to take over existing switches
and reduce the introduction of new ones by creating fake ones
that overflow the LSIDs in the network. Clearly this creates con-
nectivity problems for those Terminals connected to the affected
Switches.
Take control of old or existing switches would probably mean
its replacement with spurious or fake switches, leaving those
Service Nodes depending on those connectivity-less and iso-
lated from the system by the attack. To register into the network
[ September 25, 2018 at 1:37 – classicthesis version 3.0 ]
30 protocol vulnerability analysis
for this mechanism to take place, we again need to comply with
the security specs of the Base Node.
base node spoofing : Theoretically, only one Base Node can op-
erate in the network, so the appearance of another will distort
the normal behavior of the system due to nodes now requesting
connection to it too and the creation of unconsidered situations
by the standard.
Through this attack, one could perform a DoS against the Ser-
vice Nodes belonging to a network by letting them know the
existence of a legitimate-looking Base Node so they would con-
nect to it and the posterior loss of connection to real stimuli.
In this context, the victims cannot be chosen, as through this
mechanism an attacker just ensures Beacons are sent. Even
though we haven’t been able to find a way of ’forcing’ selected
Nodes to connect, in Chapter 4 we show the best approach we
could to achieve this effect (Section 4.3).
The only variation that could be attempted is the placement of
the Base Node. If one were to place it closer to the desired target
Nodes, it could coarsely affect the accuracy of the attack.
When the attack is carried out, downgrade of the connection
between SN and BN can occur, to a Security Profile 0 even if
the Service Node supports Profile 1. In this situation, where the
rogue element operates as a totally trusted Base Node, it can
request crucial information from the rest of the network. Exam-
ples of this could be consumption reports or even power shutdown,
meaning a DoS attack has been successfully executed.
disconnection spoofing : This attack tackles the demotion, dis-
connection or unregistration mechanism of the switches in PRIME,
which works in a similar way and can be initiated by either the
Base Node or a Service Node. In a nutshell, an attacker would
try to demote, unregister or disconnect a number nodes in the
network, which would leave them without service.
The effect of the attack would vary according to the action being
taken and so would its impact in the network being, in general,
demotion the most destructive.
If demotion took place, all the nodes connected through a
same affected Switch would suffer from this DoS.
In the case of an unregistration of a Service Node, the effect
would only apply to that specific one, denying it service
and connection.
Undergoing disconnection could suffer unregistration of a
Switch and lack of service in a connection.
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Unregistered nodes have mechanisms to connect back into their
former network, making this attack cause a temporary effect
per se. Therefore, from an strategic standpoint, it is more inter-
esting to make this serve more as a tool for a greater picture,
a mechanism to temporarily create a situation from which an-
other mechanism or attack can benefit from. This idea will be
further developed in the next chapter’s Section 4.4.
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AT TA C K D E S I G N
The goal of this work is, not only to study potential vulnerabilities
found in the PRIME Standard, but to further analyze those interesting
from a Denial of Service standpoint. Moreover, we will attempt to
design a theoretical framework in which these vulnerabilities could
be exploited for a real-world attack with moderate chances of success.
4.1 environment and infrastructure
cyberphysical infrastructure : First we will define the struc-
ture and setup which would be used when one of these attacks were
to take place.
It would consist of the mechanism needed to inject traffic into the
last mile of the Smart Grid system, in between the Smart Nodes and
the Data Concentrator, or even right into the Smart Meter itself. In
here, our injection can affect Base and Service Nodes contained in
the Smart Meter Panel and hence its potential to affect the network is
widened.
The mechanism in charge of this injection would consist of a human-
operated host (PC) connected via PLC to a modem (µ), in charge of
the connection between our interfering system and the victim net-
work. A complete view of how the structure would fit in the Last
Mile of the Smart Metering system can be seen in Figure 4.1.
On the other hand, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid counts with
the following setup, which this thesis has used as a reference (Fig-
ure 4.2).
The system consists on real and virtual equipment UC3M research
group owns, used to emulate a fully-working electrical metering net-
work infrastructure running the PRIME Standard.
Four physical Smart Meters (ZIV manufacture) and a Data Con-
centrator conform the main Panel connected with the outside. The
connection runs all the way from the PRIME Panel to an instance of
the commercial Meter Data Management System (MDMS) IRIS from
STM Telecontrol. This system is tasked with the addition of virtual
devices to the physical infrastructure of the environment, and allows
for the management of up to 11 Data Concentrators and 1593 Smart
Meters. A PRIME Sniffer (PRIME MANAGER from ZIV) is in charge
of protocol and traffic management, running connected to the electri-
cal network side by side to an Wireshark application connected to the
Ethernet network.
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Figure 4.1: Cyberphysical Structure diagram
For network performance simulations on a PRIME system, a co-
simulation framework has been used combining Matlab and OM-
NeT++ ((Varga, 2008), a modular simulation environment based in
C++), just as other projects of the same nature have employed to
model the effects of PHY and upper layers (MAC and Logical Link
Control (LLC)) [15] [2]. Application layer uses a payload modeling,
implementing DLMS/COSEM to complement the PRIME Specifica-
tion.
The goal of this is to create simulated topologies emulating a gen-
eral European low-voltage network.
4.2 attack 1 : node registration overflow
This attack depends highly on how the standard is implemented,
hence it will be detailed here according to the PRIME Specification
[8].
Upon registration with the corresponding Base Node, a Terminal
is assigned a Node Identifier (NID). This NID is conformed by the
the SID and LNID, referring back to its corresponding Switch. The
number of NIDs available for a single Switch is relatively small (see
Section 3.2.2), so this is what will present the greatest vulnerability.
Therefore, selecting a Switch and its Subnetwork as objective (prior-
itizing the most critical ones) through its SID, we can spoof multiple
registration requests until the LNID space is exhausted. Once this
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Figure 4.2: UC3M PRIME Simulation Setup
took place, a legitimate node attempting to request connection to the
Switch will face rejection due to the lack of available LNIDs for it
until timeout.
If the attack were to take place, it would present a spike of the
number of LNIDs interacting in the network due to the increase in al-
legedly "functioning" Nodes and the network’s logical topology. The
number of different LNIDs in place at the time of the attack depends
on the strength of the overflow. For instance, a study’s simulations
uses a detection threshold of 10,000 new LNIDs in a span of 600s
[15]. Clearly, the volume of SIDs needs to be significantly higher than
what the victim system can process for this behavior to turn into a
hazardous attack.
4.2.1 Implementation
A Service Node in a disconnected state shall transmit a Registration
(REG) Control packet to the Base Node for it to be included in the
Subnetwork. Thus, this is the procedure to be used by the forged
requests in the attack’s implementation.
4.2.1.1 Packet Flow: Registration Process
When we execute the registration procedure with our fake Ser-
vice Node, we first send a REG Control packet, Registration Request
(REG_REQ). However, at this point, no LNID or SID are still allocated
to the Terminal so the following values would have to be included:
PKT.LNID = 0x3FFF (no value assigned yet)
PKT.SID = j (SID of the objective Switch (victim))
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Once the request is complete, the Base Node shall allocate a unique
LNID for our Terminal, always within the domain of our chosen vic-
tim Switch and its Subnetwork. This LNID value, together with the
SID selected previously conforms the NID of the registering node.
The allocation takes place in the Response (REG_RSP):
PKT.LNID = k (LNID value assigned)
Finally, the registration is concluded by the acknowledgement of
the REG_RSP through the REG_ACK, as it is a three-way process.
The complete packet flow can be seen in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Registration procedure: success
Once this process has been executed a large number of times, large
enough to cover the complete LNID space for our desired victim
Switch Node, no more IDs are available for more nodes to connect.
At this point, when a legitimate node – either because it was discon-
nected, momentarily lacked connection, or lost connectivity by any
other reason – would now face rejection from the Base Node respon-
sible to manage said Switch, as we can see in Figure 4.4.
4.2.1.2 Packet Details: Registration Request
The first Registration Request packet is transmitted as a GPDU, iden-
tified with the PKT.C = 1 bit to be considered as Control packet. Each
type of Control message is then identified with the PKT.CTYPE field
and the payload contains the data and information of the Control
packet, different for every type.
In this case, we would need to employ Registration management
(REG) Control packets. For it, we require PKT.CTYPE = 1.
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Figure 4.4: Registration procedure: rejection
This Control packet is used to negotiate the Registration and Un-
registration process of the Nodes, and its meaning varies according
to the direction of the packet and its source.
4.2.1.3 MAC Header
Generic MAC Header fields are detailed in Figure 2.4, while its
values for the Registration Request can be found in Table 4.1 below.
field name value description / function
Unused 0 (2b) Unused bits are always 0.
HDR.HT 0 (2b) Header type. HT=0 for GPDU.
Reserved 0 (5b) Always 0 for this version, reserved for fu-
ture use.
HDR.DO 0 (1b) Down/Uplink. 0: PDU is Uplink.
HDR.LEVEL ? (2b) PDU’s Switching Hierarchy Level. If DO=0:
represents level of the transmitter.
HDR.HCS ? (8b) Header Check Sequence. Security calcula-
tion involving CRC and SNA values.
Table 4.1: REG Generic MAC Header fields
The field HDR.LEVEL is, in principle, unknown. One option would
be to try increasing value until we obtain a response from the Base
Node responsible for the Subnetwork. Generally, infrastructures do
not implement more than two or three levels of hierarchy, so the op-
tions are bearable.
Failing to succeed by trying increasing values would leave us with
the option to sniff packets from other previously connected nodes.
Registration packets would be ideal, but do not happen very often in
a normal network. However, this header is repeated for all Control
and Data packets (GPDU) thus giving the attacker many valid options.
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The computation of the last value, HDR.HCS, was seen in Section 2.4.3.1
previously. It is obtained by calculating a SCRC over the SNA and the
2 first bytes of the Header.
4.2.1.4 MAC Packet contents
We saw how the Packet consisted in header and payload, and
header fields were detailed in Figure 2.6. For our purpose of reg-
istration, the needed field values are those shown in Table 4.2.
field name value description / function
Reserved 0 (3b) Always 0 for this version. Reserved for fu-
ture use.
PKT.NAD 1 (1b) No Aggregation at Destination. 1: packet
not aggregated with other packets at desti-
nation.
PKT.PRIO 3 (2b) Indicates packet priority, from 0 to 3.
PKT.C 1 (1b) Control. C=1: it is a Control packet.
PKT.LCID /
PKT.CTYPE
1 (9b) If C=1: CTYPE (Control packet type) is used.
CTYPE = 1: Registration.
PKT.SID 0 (8b) SID upon which we request registration.
If HDR.DO=0, SID represents that of the
packet source.
PKT.LNID 0x3FFF (14b) LNID to be assigned to our requesting Termi-
nal. If HDR.DO=0, LNID represents that of
the packet source.
PKT.SPAD - (1b) 1: padding is inserted while encrypting pay-
load. Only used with Security Profile 1.
PKT.LEN len (9b) Length of packet payload (bytes).
Table 4.2: REG Packet header fields
It is worth noting that the Priority field is given the maximum
value, as in the attacker’s position we shall present no regard for
other legitimate packets’s priority and force the malicious traffic first.
As for this one and the remaining times we craft a packet with a
Service Node as a source, we will assign PKT.SID a value of 0 as the
Specification details. However, and as an additional measure, it is
recommended to sniff previous traffic to assure the target implemen-
tation follows these guidelines for Terminal’s SIDs.
Meanwhile, SPAD field is left blank as it is only employed during
the use of Security Profile 1, which is in our best interest not to use.
It will always be preferable to use Security Profile 0 (REG.SCP = 0) to
avoid unnecessary encryption problems in the attack.
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Implementation details would come into play here to decide if the
requesting Node can decide over the Security Profiling. It could be
imposed by Base Node restrictions, hence posing the extra problem
of key decryption, but as this exchange is initiated by this request’s
REG.SCP, it will be assumed that is not the case here.
The full structure of the packet can be seen in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Registration Control packet structure
Next, in Table 4.3, we can the more detailed description of the
packet contents (payload) of a Registration Request, the required val-
ues for all its fields in order to serve the needed purpose for the
attack.
As commented before, an attacker would strive for Security Profile
0 use. Hence this packet contains REG.SPC = 0 to trick the responder
Concentrator we only can manage encryption-less communications.
The field REG.CAP_PA indicates packet aggregation capabilities, and
in the uplink request direction, our Terminal indicates its own capa-
bilities. However, the downlink response is the Base Node’s means of
evaluating if all the devices int he cascaded chain (from itself to this
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field name value description / function
REG.N 0 (1b) Negative: 0 for Positive Register.
REG.R 0 (1b) Roaming: Node not yet registered, requests
a clear registration process (previous con-
nection info from this Node shall be lost).
REG.SPC 0 (2b) Security Profile Capability for Data PDUs.
Reserved 0 (2b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
REG.CAP_SW 1 (1b) Device is able to act as a Switch.
REG.CAP_PA 1 (1b) Device has packet aggregation capability.
REG.CAP_CFP 1 (1b) Device is able to perform the negotiation of
the CFP.
REG.CAP_DC 1 (1b) Device is able to perform direct connections.
REG.CAP_MC 1 (1b) Device is able to use multicast for its own
communications.
REG.CAP_PRM 1 (1b) Device is able to perform PHY Robustness
Management.
REG.CAP_ARQ 1 (1b) The device is able to establish ARQ connec-
tions.
REG.TIME - (3b) Max. waiting time for ALV_B msgs un-
til we assume disconnection. Reserved for
REG_RSP messages.
REG.EUI-48 _:_:_:_ (48b) EUI-48 of the Node requesting registration.
REG.SNK - (128b) Encrypted Subnetwork key. Not present, not
used for REG_REQ.
REG.AUK - (128b) Encrypted authentication key. Not present,
not used for REG_REQ.
Table 4.3: REG Control packet fields
Terminal) have aggregation capabilities. If they do, REG.CAP_PA = 1,
otherwise REG.CAP_PA = 0.
Note that the REG.CAP_PA, CAP_CFP, CAP_DC, CAP_MC, CAP_PRM and
CAP_ARQ fields all take value 1, for we pretend to grant the biggest ca-
pabilities possible to the Base Node in order to reduce the rejection
probability to a minimum.
"The REG Control packet, in all its usage variants, is transmitted un-
encrypted" [8]. However, some specific fields (REG.SNK and REG.AUK)
do carry encryption using secure material depending on the context.
This all conforms an authentication mechanism for the registra-
tion mechanisms through REG_ACK, from REG.AUK’s encryption in
REG_RSP to its decryption at the receiving end and possible en-
crypted retransmissions.
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Fields REG.SNK and REG.AUK have an important role only in REG_RSP
and REG_ACK with Security Profile 1 (REG.SCP = 1). For the rest of
the exchange variants in the REG message context, these fields shall
not be present in order to reduce the payload’s length.
As an additional note, in case encryption was forced, in REG_RSP,
the REG.SNK and REG.AUK are always encrypted with WK0 (see end
of Section 2.3). This means that if this field were to be cracked once,
the encryption material it provides could be reused to infinity by an
attacker. This material is shared among several nodes, connections
and requests so cracking one could mean serious key management
vulnerabilities.
The key itself is derived from random material in the SEC Control
packet [8], broadcasted to everyone in the network without encryp-
tion. From an attacker’s standpoint, having this information and any
other pairs obtained by sniffing would mean relative ease for these
keys to be cracked and used repeatedly in this scenario.
4.2.1.5 Packet Details: Registration Acknowledgement
After the Registration Request (REG_REQ) has been successfully
crafted and transmitted over to the Base Node, it would respond with
a REG_RSP packet. At that point it would be time for the attacker
to reply and end the Registration process with a REG_ACK crafted
packet. This packet means the acknowledgement of the registration
process by the Service Node.
Most fields would stay the same in the Packet Header as those in
the Request (Table 4.2), only differing in the following:
PKT.LNID = K (<0x3FFF);
use the value in REG_RSP packet, sent by the Base Node
PKT.SID = j (<0x3FFF);
use the value in REG_RSP packet, sent by the Base Node
LNID and SID values are generated by the Base Node at the time of
the Response (REG_RSP packet). Before, in the Request, these values
were both 0 as there was no Switch to refer to.
From the Response, the Terminal must take these values and incor-
porate them onto its Acknowledge packet, both different from 0.
The packet payload content is shown in Table 4.4, except for all the
Capabilities’ values (REG.CAP_SW, PA, CFP. . . ) whose values stay the
same as those seen in the Registration Request before, Table 4.3.
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field name value description / function
REG.N 0 (1b) Negative: 0 for Positive Register.
REG.R 0 (1b) Roaming: previous connection info from
this Node shall be lost.
REG.SPC 0 (1b) Security Profile Capability for Data PDUs.
Reserved 0 (1b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
REG.EUI-48 _:_:_:_
(48b)
EUI-48 of the Node requesting registration.
REG.SNK - (128b) Encrypted Subnetwork key. Only present in
Security Profile 1.
REG.AUK - (128b) Encrypted Authentication key. Only present
in Security Profile 1.
Table 4.4: REG ACK Control packet fields
4.2.2 Extra: Forced Node Disconnection
Finally, we might encounter the event that even though the remain-
ing LNID space has been completed, but the victim nodes are still
connected to the network thanks to them connecting before the at-
tack launched. The objective of the attack is to leave all nodes out of
the network, service-less and then face lack of LNIDs at reconnection
attempt.Therefore an attacker in this situation would have to force
disconnection of those node already in the network.
This behavior will be seen in greater detail in Attack #3, Section 4.4,
but forced Node Disconnection can be executed through the forge of
Unregistration Request packets. This makes the target Terminal think
the Base Node is ordering its disconnection from the subnetwork and
ends up requesting it itself.
According to the specification [8], "when assigning an LNID, the
Base Node shall not reuse an LNID released by an unregister process
until after (macMaxCtlReTx +1) * macCtlReTxTimer seconds, to ensure
that all retransmit packets have left the Subnetwork".
This would mean that once the node has been forced to disconnect,
an attacker would need to wait that reuse time to keep occupying those
LNID values before the nodes attempt reconnection.
4.3 attack 2 : node registration spoofing
Here we will explain in greater detail the steps needed to execute
a Node impersonation attack. When it takes place, the rogue node
will hijack the communications and functions of a legitimate working
Service Node in the target network.
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As commented before during the Denial of Service analysis Sec-
tion 3.3.1, this attack reaches its biggest damage potential when used
against a system that assigns a new NID to an already-registered EUI-
48 requesting registration. This would mean a spoofer node register-
ing with a victim’s address in the same Base Node could effectively
leave the victim out of the network by channeling all its communica-
tion through a different NID.
The execution of a spoofing of this type depends highly on the time-
out presented by the Base Node. How long it takes the Base Node
to unregister a Terminal within its reach conditions the effectiveness
of the attack. Optimally, we would want the higher value possible so
no unwanted unregistrations take place during the time of the attack.
Through a long timeout value, even a node that gets disconnected to
the network and reconnected again would then mimic the behavior
of an attacker’s spoofer node.
4.3.1 Implementation
In order to obtain a victim’s EUI-48 address, the preceding step
to attempting a registration onto its Base Node, one can make use
of a technique mentioned previously: Sniffing. This address could
be obtained also by direct access to the Node, where the number is
shown in a screen. However here it will be assumed no physical
access to the node and hence being sniffing the best option available.
Through this technique we can gain access to that desired Node
Identification and perform the spoofed Node’s registration. This is
possible because the information travels unencrypted through the net-
work, as it could be expected of a registration process of this nature.
Afterwards, registration of the spoofed node needs to take place,
following the usual procedure. Packet contents and structure’s de-
tails of the Registration Control packet (REG) can be found in Ta-
ble 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, together with the diagrams back in
Section 2.4.1.
4.3.1.1 Registration Process: Traffic Traces
The exchange’s trace from the perspective of the Base Node would
look like the following for a Registration process:
[RX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz UP level:0 frametime:__ SCP
REG_REQ: eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 spc:0 caps:0x45
(...)
[TX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz DO level:0
REG_RSP:
eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 lnid:A spc:0 caps:0x47 time:_
[September 25, 2018 at 1:37 - classicthesis version 3.0]
44 attack design
(...)
4.3.1.2 Registration Spoofing: Steps and Traces
However, we first need to check the system’s Base Node manufac-
turer implemented behavior (2) from those mentioned at the begin-
ning of this Attack section and further described in Section 3.2.2 of
the protocol study. This behavior means the repeated registration of
the same EUI-48, the same device, is assigned a different LNID every
time. Once checked, we would need to exploit this situation by reg-
istering our rogue Service Node onto the network as a previously
registered node (the victim), impersonating its functions and commu-
nications.
The checking and exploitation process would be the following:
i Registration (I) occurs when the request is sent to the Base Node
(Z) with the node’s LNID, to which I will refer here as LNID (A).
ii Registration request (II) is later sent and this same Base Node
accepts it, assigning a new different LNID, LNID (B).
This proves the Base Node is using the desired behavior for the
attack.
iii As an attacker, we could spoof this second request, Registration
(II), forcing the Base Node to change the assignation from LNID
(A) to LNID (B), which the attacker controls and effectively hi-
jacks the legitimate node’s functions.
[RX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz UP level:0 frametime:__ SCP
REG_REQ: eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 spc:0 caps:0x45
(...)
[TX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz DO level:0
REG_RSP:
eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 lnid:A spc:0 caps:0x47 time:_
(...)
...
[RX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz UP level:0 frametime:__ SCP
REG_REQ: eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 spc:0 caps:0x45
(...)
[TX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:zz DO level:0
REG_RSP:
eui48: _:_:_:_:_:xx sid:0 lnid:B spc:0 caps:0x47 time:_
(...)
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Proof of the attack being executed would be the multiple registra-
tion attempts of a Terminal Node, ending up with different LNID
value afterwards.
Now the victim’s communications are hijacked and the packet flow
to it will stop and be redirected towards our Spoofer Node. Changes
in the LNID, which can be seen marked in blue, highlight how the
spoofer has taken over the real node. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the
Base Node, the legitimate Service Node has just re-registered and has
just been given a new LNID.
Depending on the distance from the attacker to the victim node, the
behavior observed by the victim node can differ. Being at a great dis-
tance and connected through different switches will leave the victim
no chance of detection and simply stop receiving packets meant for it.
However, if they are close to each other, the victim could experiment
a flow of anomalous packets and receive an unwanted Registration
Request response. This leaves the door open on the side of the victim
Terminal to update its LNID and adapt to the changes presented by
the Base Node, thus stopping the attack as designed. This behavior is
implementation-dependent and not directly present in the standard.
4.4 attack 3 : base node spoofing
Only one Base Node per network is allowed. If an attacker man-
aged to inject a second one, it would severely disturb the network.
Moreover if all nodes were to disconnect from the legitimate concen-
trator and connect to the attacker’s rogue Base Node, they would
be left at their mercy while thinking everything is working perfectly
for them. This attack presents this exact possibility: Terminals being
forced to disconnect from the real Base Node and being given the
chance to connect to a forged Base Node that would, in reality, just
keep them connected but service-less.
This risk (Section 3.3.1) presents great potential damage to a work-
ing network, leaving its Terminals with a connection to a spoofed
Base Node they believe will forward them legitimate data, but effec-
tively disconnected from the real network.
However, this attack presented the necessity for the Nodes to dis-
connect from the real functioning Base Node in order to get them
reconnected to the spoofed one, a serious drawback for the attack to
take place on its own.
This leaves the effectiveness depending on how an attacker could
make this reconnection happen, potentially through forcing another
unwanted behavior in the nodes.
In this case, the Demotion/Unregistration/Disconnection Spoofing (Sec-
tion 3.3.1) appears as a viable option. This attack consisted on inject-
ing traffic onto the node’s communications to make Service Nodes
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think their Base Node is ordering them to disconnect from the net-
work.
Assuming this were to happen, when a Node is finally discon-
nected due to the traffic injection, it will become subject to becoming
a victim of the aforementioned Base Node Spoofing attack.
4.4.1 Implementation
The first step would be to place the malicious Base Node we plan
on using for the spoofing. This, of course, would depend on the
actual network chosen as victim, whose topology could be already
known or learnt from using sniffing techniques commented previ-
ously. Modulation techniques would also play a significant role, but
it is outside the scope of this thesis.
Following that, carrying out the Demotion/Unregistration/Disconnec-
tion Spoofing would be next, by inserting, via our proposed infrastruc-
ture (Figure 4.1), the corresponding traffic for Service Node discon-
nection: CON_CLS_B.
This injection will make it think the instruction came from the Base
Node and will answer accordingly. An answer the Base Node itself
would interpret as a disconnection request from the Terminal (as ex-
plained in Section 3.3.1). The attack is to be repeated for the target
Service Nodes in the network until all targeted nodes are affected and
thus, disconnected from the original Base Node.
As our Spoofer Node is already in place, disconnected nodes would
then request connection to our Base Node. This request would be
made thanks to the Base Node transmitting the adequate Beacons to
alert those Terminals of its existence.
As they receive the Beacon and have no other Base Node to connect
to, the recently disconnected Terminals request registration onto our
malicious Concentrator. Once the registration is completed and both
sides have agreed on communication parameters, that Service Node
would effectively be out of service and away from the functioning
network’s reach.
With the Terminals connected to the malicious Base Node, it now
would need to keep them connected and feeling their communication
is stable through Keep Alive messages even though no effective data
will reach them.
4.4.1.1 Disconnection Process
At any point, Base or Service Node might chose to end an existing
connection, what is known as Disconnection process. If any of the ele-
ments receives a disconnection request, the Node shall acknowledge
it and begin the process actions. Another option is to approach this
from an unregistration perspective, but we will opt for the former
here, disconnection.
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Once successfully unregistered, a Service Node shall move back to
a Disconnected functional state, while the Base Node shall relocate the
resources that were being employed for the Terminal. If this process
were to be begun by a Service Node, as it will be shown in this de-
scription, the packet exchange would look as it does in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Unregistration process, initiated by a Service Node
The Disconnection process will occur through the use of the CON
Control packet (PKT.CTYPE = 2). It is generally used for negotiating
connections and, as well as some others seen before, its meaning
varies depending on the direction it goes and its values. The com-
plete structure of the CON packet can be seen in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Connection Control Packet
This diagram shows the complete version of this CON_CLS packet,
including all optional fields. However, some of them would not be
present in the traffic this attack needs to generate. Only the CON.N
field is relevant in closing an existing connection.
The packet needed here would be 12 octets shorter in total. When
CON.D is 0, CON.DCNAD, CON.DSSID, CON.DCLNID, CON.DCLID, CON.DCSID
and the reserved field between DCNAD and DSSID will not be present
in the message (6 octects less). In addition, when CON.E is 0, the field
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CON.EUI-48 will not be present, making the message another 6 octets
smaller.
As a side note, the alternative way to run this step commented pre-
viously, unregistration, would need of Registration Control packets
(REG) instead of Connection Control ones. In a similar fashion, they
would take on the form of REG_UNR packets to initiate the process.
For this scenario, we have decided to craft a Connection Close
(CON_CLS) packet coming from a fake Base Node, denoted as CON_
CLS_B. This means the target for this first spoofed packet is the Ser-
vice Node we want to force disconnection upon.
Once a Service Node receives a CON_CLS, presumably coming
from its Base Node above, it will reply back. This reply message,
CON_CLS_S, would unleash a chain reaction between Base and Ser-
vice Node that ends up on the Terminal’s forced disconnection from
the Subnetwork. This scenario was explained in detail in Section 3.3.1’s
Disconnection Spoofing.
The detailed value description for each field in the packet is found
in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. Note that Table 4.5 shows only the most
significant values for the Control Packet header and those changing
value, the rest maintain the same values used for the REG packet in
previous attacks (Table 4.2). Generic MAC Header values (Table 4.1)
will not be shown in a new table; they maintain the same values used
before.
field name value description / function
HDR.DO 1 (1b) 1: MAC PDU is Downlink.
PKT.C 1 (1b) Control. C=1 if it is a Control packet.
PKT.LCID /
PKT.CTYPE
2 (9b) If C=1, CTYPE represents the Control
packet type. CTYPE = 2. Connection.
PKT.SID 0 (8b) If HDR.DO=1, SID represents that of the
packet destination.
PKT.LNID ? (14b) If HDR.DO=1, LNID represents that of the
packet destination.
PKT.LEN len (9b) Length of packet payload (bytes).
Table 4.5: CON Packet header fields
Regarding the header, and given this is one of the few packets
needed to go downlink, some values present significant change. SID
is now 0 for the packet’s destination is a Terminal, not a Switch. Sim-
ilarly LNID is now referring to the victim Node’s Identifier, whose
value is given by the Concentrator at the time of registration. For this
reason, the most viable way of obtaining such value from the point of
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view of an attacker is sniffing any of the packets between these two
devices, where this value will be present.
field name value description / function
CON.N 1 (1b) Negative connection.
CON.D 0 (1b) Information about direct connection is not
carried by this packet.
CON.ARQ 0 (1b) ARQ mechanism is not enabled for this con-
nection.
CON.E 0 (1b) EUI presence. 0: Not having EUI-48. Con-
nection management towards Base Node.
Reserved 0 (3b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
CON.LCID ? (9b) LCID of the connection being managed. 0-
255: connection initiated by Base Node. 256-
511: connection initiated by Service Node.
CON.EUI-48 - (48b) Not present.
Reserved 0 (7b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
CON.DCLCID - (9b) Not present.
CON.DCNAD - (1b) Not present.
Reserved - (1b) Not present.
CON.DCLNID - (14b) Not present.
CON.DSSID - (8b) Not present.
CON.DCSID - (8b) Not present.
CON.TYPE ? (8b) Connection Type. Identify which Conver-
gence layer to be used.
CON.DLEN len (8b) Length of CON.DATA field (bytes).
CON.DATA (variable) Connection specific parameters, depend on
Convergence Layer.
Table 4.6: CON Control packet fields
Just like it happens with the LNID field in the header, the CON.LCID
value in the packet’s payload would need to be sniffed from some pre-
vious traffic between these two devices. It represents a local value for
their connection, fixed during the registration process, and nothing
intrinsic to the devices one could know beforehand.
One should note how the CON.TYPE field cannot be fixed here. Its
value depends on the Convergence Layer being used in each specific
implementation. In addition, the DATA field is also Convergence Layer
specific and thus cannot be defined here as those parameters specify
each individual connection. For more details on each of the options,
refer to Annex E of the PRIME Specification for this version [8].
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When the Service Node receives this packet presumably from the
Base Node, the Terminal would interpret the Base Node considers
their connection no longer active. The victim Service Node will ac-
knowledge the situation with a CON_CLS_S packet, that will serve
as a trigger in the Concentrator to effectively disconnect both parties
involved.
4.4.1.2 Beaconing Process
Each Service Node keeps a table of Switch and Base Nodes inter-
nally, updated upon reception of Beacon PDUs. The disconnected
Node then decides, based on implementation policies, a Concentra-
tor upon to which request registration.
If no beacons were received in an specified time span (macMin-
SwitchSearchTime, see [8] for more information), the Terminal would
broadcast a PNPDU itself. A PNPDU that the legitimate Base Node
could receive and attempt to reconnect such node. As an attacker,
one shall avoid that event by broadcasting a Beacon PDU before the
timeout, attracting the Terminal and inviting it to register.
BPDUs are explained in greater detail in Section 2.4.2, but its main
use is broadcasting information on Subnetwork’s frame structure and
is used by disconnected Service Nodes to acknowledge the existence
of Switch/Base Nodes in its vicinity.
Switch and Base Nodes have the transmission role for these BPDUs.
However, as in our forged Subnetworks there are no Switches, the
Base Node itself would be in charge of its complete transmission to
attract victim Terminals that just suffered the Disconnection attack.
The Beacon PDU our rogue Base Node would need to transmit
would contain the values in Table 4.7.
There are some remarkable fields whose value needs some addi-
tional explanation. QLTY takes a value of 7 (maximum) as we would
be operating as the network’s own Base Node.
Similarly, LEVEL takes the maximum value – all 1s – as the Base
Node is on the top of the Switch hierarchy.
We would not want to create space for other Switches to transmit
their beacons in the MAC frame, so BCN.CNT = 1 in order to define a
single Beacon slot in the frame for the Base Node.
Frequency of transmission is maximized (FRQ = 0) as we would
desire maximum transmission priority and frequency within each
frame, reason why Base Nodes shall always transmit exactly one Bea-
con per frame. The Base Node at that point has no other goal but to
ease the way for Terminals to connect.
Finally, the SNA and SID values can be crafted by the attacker, as
no service is going to be served and no external parameters need to
be followed. If the transmitting device was a Switch, SNA would be
that of the Base Node on top and SID that of the Switch itself, but
in this case the transmitter is the actual Base Node so the values are
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equal. Depending on specific topologic conditions, an attacker might
want to learn about surrounding Base Node and Switch identification
values so those are not repeated when crafting values for the rogue
Beacon, causing undesired problems.
4.4.1.3 Registration Process
Now, the recently disconnected Terminal Nodes (in Disconnected
functional state) shall proceed to carry out the registration process,
just as we saw in Attack #1 (Section 4.2). They need to transmit a
REG Control packet to our Base Node to get included in the Subnet-
work and start receiving traffic again, even though that is exactly the
opposite of what they would see happen.
When the Service Node requested connection to our Spoofer BN,
the negotiation would be that in Figure 4.3 and the MAC PDU’s con-
tent is detailed in Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.
After the Registration Requests we would receive as Base Node,
one shall then reply with the subsequent accept message (we do not
consider rejecting any). For this purpose, the first step it should take
is to allocate a NID value for each node trying to be part of the Sub-
network it manages.
The Response packet REG_RSP would be similar to that of the Re-
quest, but the needed changes are detailed below in Table 4.8.
Again, the LNID value would be assigned by us, the Base Node, and
will identify that node within the Subnetwork. It will have a value <
0x3FFF.
The packet’s destination is a Terminal, not a Switch, which is why
it is given a SID value of 0 as we have done throughout this work.
Now regarding the REG.TIME value, we have a special case for this
field takes on a value of zero except for the Registration Response. In
the RSP, we have chosen to maximize its value in order to increase the
Terminals’ tolerance to unregistration without a Keep-Alive packet.
The higher this number, the less ALV_B packets the Terminal needs
before assuming unregistration.
If the attack were to take place over a real Subnetwork, traffic traces
during the Base Node Spoofing attack would include something like
those shown below. These are taken from a simulated Smart Meter
Panel in [15].
[RX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:aa UP level:0 frametime:__ SCP
REG_REQ: eui48: _:_:_:_:_:bb sid:0 spc:0 caps:0x45
(...)
...
...
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[RX]
GPDU: sna: _:_:_:_:_:cc UP level:0 frametime:__ SCP
REG_RSP: eui48: _:_:_:_:_:dd sid:0 spc:0 caps:0x45
(...)
The traces show how, despite being in a single Subnetwork, where
only one Base Node is supposed to be operating, something does
not work as expected. First, a Terminal with EUI: . . . :bb requests
Registration upon the . . . :aa Concentrator and later a different Service
Node (. . . :dd) connects to a second Base Node with address . . . :cc,
which would be the malicious device the attacker controls.
4.4.1.4 Subnetwork Maintenance: Keep-Alive Process
Once successfully connected to the attacker’s Base Node, it needs
to maintain its basic functions as such to keep the victim Terminals
under its control. For this, the Keep-Alive process is a vital procedure
the rogue Concentrator needs to take care of.
The Keep-Alive process is used to detect if a Service Node leaves a
Subnetwork it was registered onto. This can be decided due to fatal
errors it is unable to recover from, changes in its configuration, etc
From registration time (reception of REG_RSP), the Service Node
starts a timer Tkeep-alive, employing the REG.TIME field for it. From
here, every time this node receives a ALV_B packet, it will restart
such timer with the value from the ALV.TIME field in the packet.
If the timer were to ever expire, the Service Node would assume
the Base Node has unregistered it from the network. The Service
Node is also in charge of the transmission of the ALV_S packet back
to the Base Node before Tkeep-alive with the same purpose. Otherwise,
it would be removed from the Switch tables.
The packet header and payload field values for the ALV_B the Base
Node needs to transmit are as seen on Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 respec-
tively. As before, only the most significant packet header values are
shown, the rest stays as shown in Table 4.2, as well as Generic MAC
PDU Header’s values (Table 4.1). This excludes HDR.DO as the packet
is intended to go from Base to Service Node, downstream direction
(ALV_B):
HDR.DO = 1 (Keep-Alive message from the Base Node, ALV_B)
In the header, PKT.LNID values would normally be obtained by
sniffing the previous exchanges in the Subnetwork. However, now
it is the Base Node controlled by the attacker the Node responsible
for the LNID management (and assignment, at registration time), so
it would be a known value at the time this packet needs to be sent.
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The ALV.TXCNT and ALV.RXCNT fields are meant to keep track of
the number of Keep-Alive packets a Node transmits and receives,
respectively. This applies for both the Base Node and the Service
Node. The field has a cyclic nature, as represented by the Modulo 8
in its description. These counters are reset to 0 in the Registration
process.
"The algorithm used by the Base Node to determine when to send
ALV_B messages to registered Service Nodes and how to determine
the value ALV.TIME and REG.TIME is not detailed" in the PRIME
Specification for v1.3.6. [8]
It is worth noting how, while most of the previous Control packets
before had PKT.SID = 0 (due to it being transmitted by a Terminal),
now it is the Base Node who sends it. This means the value for this
field needs to be that which the Concentrator acquired during the
Beaconing process (Table 4.7).
4.5 attack 4 : lsid overflow
As explained in Section 3.3.1, this attack consists on the over- pro-
motion of nodes to Switches, thus blocking the promotion of new le-
gitimate ones due to the LSID space being full as well as taking over
existing working Switches. At that point, all real nodes connected to
the malicious Switches will experience serious service problems.
Blocking the entrance of real Switches into a network implies the
completion of the LSID space, where there are not new values avail-
able. This is possible because there are only 256 possibilities (8 bit
value) for this field, a relatively weak point from a Denial of Service
perspective.
As some of the previous attacks seen in this chapter, there is high
implementation dependence for the accurate description of this over-
flow.
For the attack to occur, similarly to the LNID Registration Overflow,
there needs to be a noticeable growth in the number of different SIDs
for a determined time span. As the previously mentioned case, the
volume of SIDs needs to be significantly higher than what the victim
system can process for this behavior to turn into a hazardous attack.
In the same study referenced in that Section 4.2 [15], shows how the
attack could set the detection threshold when the number of LSIDs
exceed 200 for an interval of 3,600 seconds.
4.5.1 Implementation
For both "variations" on the attack (exhaustion of LSIDs and Switch
hijacking), the same first steps are needed so the two will be explained
alongside each other.
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4.5.1.1 Registration Process
This process maintains the same registration procedures detailed
in previous attacks (Section 4.2). In here, a disconnected Node re-
quests registration (REG Control packet) upon a Base Node, asking
to become part of its Subnetwork. After a positive response, the ne-
gotiation is acknowledged and now that node has a LNID assigned.
The complete successful packet flow communication is shown in
Figure 4.3. The details of the packets needed to be sent from the
side of our rogue Node are again detailed in Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and
Table 4.3.
4.5.1.2 Switch Promotion Process
The next step towards our goal would be to transform those Service
Nodes recently registered onto the network into Switches.
According to the PRIME Specification [8], for this use two mecha-
nisms arise as adequate candidates for the task: Promotion Needed
PDUs and PRO Control packets. Promotion Needed PDUs are a type
of MAC packet working as a notification from a disconnected Node
to any of its neighboring Terminals requesting the promotion of any
of them who could turn into Switch. It is used when the discon-
nected Node has not received any Beacons for connection and lacks
connectivity with any existing Switches.
However, the PRO Control packet (PKT.CTYPE = 3) is the chosen
one for this functionality: "promoting a Service Node from Termi-
nal function to Switch function" [8]. Remember that Control packets
are encapsulated inside of Generic MAC PDUs. As seen before, this
packet can take on different meanings depending on its direction and
values inside.
Below, in Figure 4.8, we can see what the exchange would look like
for a case like ours: successful Promotion Request initiated by the
Service Node.
For the Generic MAC Header values, the packet shall employ the
same values the Registration Request used before, see Table 4.1. Just
like it has been done in previous occasions for the PRO Control packet
header values (Table 4.11), here we will only show those most signifi-
cant and different from those used in Table 4.2. As a reminder due to
it being referenced in the tables below, the value for HDR.DO is still 0,
as the packet goes in uplink direction.
The complete structure of the PRO Control packet can be seen in
Figure 4.9. In this case, we need to send a PRO_REQ_S packet, as
it encapsulates the Promotion Request initiated by the Service Node.
This PRO_REQ_S includes all fields in a PRO packet, whereas other
messages only contain PRO.N, PRO.RC, PRO.TIME and PRO.NSID.
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Figure 4.8: Connection Control Packet
Later, in Table 4.12, we can find a detailed representation of all
the field values needed for this purpose in the PRO_REQ_S packet’s
payload.
Note that, according to the PRIME Specification, the PNA could be
another node’s EUI-48, not necessarily the sender’s. In this case, each
node is meant to manage its own promotion so it should be its own.
In order to get the Promotion Requests to be accepted by the Base
Node, it is needed to use different PNAs in the various packets to be
sent so the Base Node is tricked into accepting such requests to turn
the Nodes into new Switches. The value for packet header’s SID = 0
as the transmitting device is still functioning as Service Node.
Also in the header, the LNID value is that which was given to the
Terminal during the Registration process. Therefore, this value would
not be unknown for the operator of the Service Node itself as it would
have appeared in previous exchanges with the Base Node.
It is worth remarking fields UPCOST and DNCOST, whose value would
be calculated "in the same way a Switch Node calculates the value it
places into its own Beacon PDU" [8]. This field cannot be established
here in a general way, and would assume different value depending
on the Network specifications and the modulation scheme used in
every hop of the topology (in each direction).
Furthermore, the PRO.SWC_DC, SWC_MC, SWC_PRM and SWC_ARQ fields
all take value 1, for we pretend to grant the biggest capabilities possi-
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Figure 4.9: Connection Control Packet
ble to the Base Node in order to reduce the rejection probability to a
minimum.
Once the Request has been executed, the Base Node in charge of
the Subnetwork would reply (assuming fits its requirements and the
request is accepted) with a PRO_REQ_B message. This Promotion
process would need to be closed with the acknowledgement from
the hands of the device who started the process, our Terminal. This
packet means the acknowledgement of the successful Promotion pro-
cess by the Service Node.
The packet header stays the same as that of the Promotion Request
(Table 4.11), so it will not be repeated again.
medskip The packet payload content is shown in Table 4.13, but
only the most important fields and those presenting changes com-
pared to the Request.
PKT.NSID = K (<0x3FFF), where K would be the value in PRO_REQ
_B (Response packet), sent by the Base Node. NSID value is generated
by the Base Node at the time of the Response (PRO_REQ_B packet)
and this one shall be copied from that packet’s. Before, in the Re-
quest, this value was 0 as there was no Switch to refer to as source, it
was still a Terminal.
Repeating this Promotion Request enough number of times would
result in the exhaustion of the LSID space that would lead to new
Switch Promotion Requests being rejected by the Base Node.
4.5.1.3 Switch Hijacking Process
Depending on the implementation used in the Base Node we could
find that once the LSID limit is reached, the Base Node could decide
to demote the oldest switches to make room for the new (rogue) ones.
Replacing old switches, with nodes associated to them, with new
bogus devices would mean serious connectivity problems for the Ter-
minals working at the orders of those demoted. However, it would
be hard to determine the switches being replaced first as there is a
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high implementation dependence in this aspect. As a result, rather
than a targeted attack to a specific Switch, it would be more effective
to opt for a brute-force alternative: continue promoting devices until
no real Switch is
Once the legitimate Switches have been all removed, though the
beaconing process, the working nodes would be attracted to the rogue
switches now in the network via the Beaconing mechanism (review
Section 4.4 for more information on packet forging details for it).
These nodes would request registration, to which it would be nec-
essary to respond (refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for details on this,
taking into account the needed variations for an adequate REG_RSP
packet, as seen in Table 4.8).
Following the registration process, maintenance of the Subnetwork
needs to happen in order to trick the legitimate Terminals into the illu-
sion they are connected to a real Switch and just waiting for data they
will never receive. For this, it is necessary to maintain the Keep-Alive
process under control, as detailed in Attack 2, Section 4.4 (packet
details: Table 4.9 and Table 4.10).
4.5.1.4 Extra: Base Node Beacon Management
At some point, the Base Node could decide to change parameters
in the Beacon or exchange information about its transmission. For
this, the Beacon Slot Information (BSI) Control packet (PKT.CTYPE =
4) would be employed.
These packets are generated by Base and Switch Nodes but need
to be acknowledged even in case of rejection by the receiving devices,
including ours. As a rogue Switch, it is not likely that an attacker
would send any of these, but could be its receptor.
For detailed instructions on how the Acknowledgement packet needs
to be crafted, refer to Section 4.4.5.6 of [8].
4.6 discarded implementations .
Some attacks attempting a successful exploit of some of the vul-
nerabilities commented previously in this work have been already
tested. However, the approaches below did not meet the expected
results regarding performance, harm, or noticeable effects on a nor-
mally functioning network. Here, they will be briefly explained here
even though they will be discarded due to their results not meeting
the effectiveness desired.
4.6.1 Promotion Needed Flooding
According to this experiment carried out in [15], the performance of
the attack in a simulated environment, showed how in a network the
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number of Switches would significantly increase as one would expect,
regarding the attack’s behavior commented previously. There is an
increase in the congestion in the network due to the more frequent
PNPDU messages flowing and promoting nodes to Switches. This, of
course, overcomplicates the network topology.
Even though the smart meters able to report their activity is re-
duced noticeably, the final statistical results for "the time needed to
obtain the readings" are not significantly larger when undergoing the
attack. This would mean that, despite the attack, the network would
be able to operate at a reduced rate reporting reads with no high
degradation in the time needed.
4.7 attack extensions
Some of the mechanisms used in the previous sections of this chap-
ter can allow an attacker to perform extra inferences with the target
systems. Even though they do not conform an active asset for a De-
nial of Service attack beyond its use in some of the attacks before, they
can then generate considerable collateral effects and serve as valuable
tools.
4.7.1 Sniffing
Sniffing was used in the Node Registration Spoofing attack and need-
ed/recommended in most of the rest for diverse purposes. It can be
used as well to eavesdrop crucial information flowing through the
network, proven useful in attacking offensive scenarios.
If a sniffer was put in place during a consumption report request
or transmission, apart from its use in the attack, it can allow the
attacker to obtain such report interpreting the data contained in the
packet. From the hexadecimal trace, data and consumption data can
be obtained.
Here it should be noted that this collateral leak of information is
dependent on the use of Security Profile 0 configuration by the sys-
tem, whereas it is not necessary for its "main" use on this report as
the desired data then always travels in clear text.
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field name value description / function
Unused - (2b) Alignment with MAC_H field in PPDU
header.
HDR.HT 2 (2b) Header Type. 2: Beacon PDU.
Reserved 0 (1b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
BCN.QLTY 7 (3b) Quality of round-trip connectivity from this
Switch to Base. Base Node: 7 (max).
BCN.SID ? (8b) Switch identifier of transmitting Switch.
BCN.CNT 1 (3b) #Beacon slots in the frame.
BCN.SLT 0 (3b) Slot in which this BPDU is transmitted. 0:
reserved for Base Node.
BCN.CFP 0 (10b) Offset of CFP from start of frame
BCN.CFP=0 indicates absence of CFP
in a frame.
Reserved 0 (1b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
BCN.LEVEL 0x3F (6b) Hierarchy of transmitting Switch in Subnet-
work. 0x3F: max.
BCN.SEQ 0 (5b) Sequence# of this BPDU in super frame. In-
cremented for every Base Node’s beacon,
propagated down by Switches.
BCN.FRQ 0 (3b) Transmission frequency of this BPDU. 0: 1
Beacon per frame.
BCN.SNA ? (48b) SNA in which the Switch transmitting this
BPDU is located.
BCN.UPCOST 0 (8b) Total Uplink cost from the transmitting
Switch to the Base Node. Base Node: UP-
COST = 0.
BCN.DNCOST 0 (8b) Total Downlink cost from the Base Node
to the transmitting Switch. Base Node:
DNCOST = 0.
CRC ? (32b) Calculated as explained in Section 2.4.3.1,
over the complete BPDU except for the CRC
field itself.
Table 4.7: Beacon PDU fields
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field name value description / function
HDR.DO 1 (1b) 1: MAC PDU is Downlink.
PKT.SID 0 (8b) If HDR.DO=1, SID represents that of the
packet destination.
PKT.LNID ? (b) If HDR.DO=1, LNID represents that of the
packet destination.
REG.SPC 0 (2b) Security Profile Capability for Data PDUs.
REG.TIME 7 (3b) Time to wait for ALV messages before as-
suming disconnection from the Base Node.
TIME = 7 -> 4096 seconds ∼68.3 mins.
Table 4.8: REG RSP Control packet fields
field name value description / function
PKT.C 1 (1b) Control. C=1: it is a Control packet.
PKT.LCID /
PKT.CTYPE
2 (9b) If C=1, CTYPE represents the Control
packet type. CTYPE = 2 for Connection.
PKT.SID ? (8b) If HDR.DO=0, SID represents that of the
packet source.
PKT.LNID ? (14b) LNID assigned to our Terminal. If
HDR.DO=0, LNID represents that of the
packet source.
PKT.LEN len (9b) Length of packet payload (bytes).
Table 4.9: ALV Packet header fields
field name value description / function
ALV.RXCNT 0 (3b) Counter for # of received ALVs (mod 8).
ALV.TXCNT 1 (3b) Counter for # of transmitted ALVs (mod 8).
Reserved 0 (7b) Always 0 for this version of the protocol.
ALV.TIME 7 (3b) Time to wait for ALV messages before as-
suming disconnection from the Base Node.
TIME = 7 -> 4096 seconds ∼68.3 mins.
ALV.SSID 0xFF (8b) 0xFF for Terminals. SID for Switches.
Table 4.10: ALV Control Packet fields
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field name value description / function
PKT.C 1 (1b) Control. C=1: it is a Control packet.
PKT.LCID /
PKT.CTYPE
3 (9b) If C=1, CTYPE represents the Control
packet type. CTYPE = 3 for Promotion.
PKT.SID 0 (8b) If HDR.DO=0, SID represents that of the
packet source.
PKT.LNID ? (14b) LNID assigned to our Terminal. If
HDR.DO=0, LNID represents that of the
packet source.
PKT.LEN len (9b) Length of packet payload (bytes).
Table 4.11: PRO Packet header fields
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field name value description / function
PRO.N 0 (1b) N=0 for Positive promotion (to Switch).
Reserved 0 (1b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
Always 0 for this one.
PRO.RQ 7 (3b) Receive quality of PNPDU from Terminal re-
questing promotion. 7: max.
PRO.TIME ? (3b) The ALV.TIME value being used by this Ter-
minal.
PRO.NSID 0xFF (8b) New Switch Identifier of the Terminal
whose promotion is being managed, to be
assigned by the Base Node.
PRO.PNA _:_:_:_
(48b)
Promotion Need Address. EUI-48 of the Ter-
minal requesting promotion. Only included
in the PRO_REQ_S message.
PRO.UPCOST ? (8b) Total Uplink cost from the Terminal Node
to the Base Node. Only included in the
PRO_REQ_S message.
PRO.DNCOST ? (8b) Total Downlink cost from the Base Node to
the Terminal Node. Only included in the
PRO_REQ_S message.
Reserved 0 (4b) Reserved for future versions of the protocol.
Always 0 for this one.
PRO.SWC_DC 1 (1b) Direct Connection Switching Capability. 1:
device able to behave as Direct Switch.
PRO.SWC_MC 1 (1b) Multicast Switching Capability. 1: device
able to behave as Direct Switch.
PRO.SWC_PRM 1 (1b) PHY Robustness Management Switching
Capability. 1: device able to perform PRM
for Terminals when behaving as a Switch.
PRO.SWC_ARQ 1 (1b) ARQ Buffering Switching Capability. 1: de-
vice able to perform buffering for ARQ con-
nections while switching.
Table 4.12: PRO Control Packet fields
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field name value description / function
PRO.N 0 (1b) N=0 for Positive promotion (to Switch).
PRO.NSID ? (8b) New Switch Identifier of the Terminal
whose promotion is being managed, to be
assigned by the Base Node.
PRO.PNA _:_:_:_ (48b) Promotion Need Address. EUI-48 of the Ter-
minal requesting promotion. Only included
in the PRO_REQ_S message.
Table 4.13: PRO Control Packet fields
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5
C O N C L U S I O N
Smart Grid implementations are growing in number every day and
that fact strengthens the need for secure design and development of
such technology. I trust this thesis can help with the improvement of
various security aspects of the PRIME Specification seen here in the
form of attack designs.
This work has been built on the decision of focusing mainly on De-
nial of Service attacks for this infrastructure as it has presented itself
as one of its main weakness. Previous instances of Internet of Things
applications have suffered from this same hazard and poses itself as
a remarkable threat for Smart Grid real-life secure implementations.
These attacks are powerful in that they do not always need a unique
critical crack in the protocol’s design but can exploit several small
mistakes or simply open unguarded "doors" to take down a service
as crucial as this one. This makes for a greater chance of finding pos-
sibilities for attack designs fulfilling our requirements, using either
one or multiple vulnerabilities found in the standard’s analysis.
One should also note the Critical Infrastructure status Smart Grid
applications present regarding its desired role in society and the func-
tioning of future cities. This status has clearly limited the free access
to real devices and tools to study PRIME, as it will be commented
later on. Smarter equipment makes for greater opportunities but at
the same time for greater risks if the service was controlled by the
wrong hands.
5.1 objectives
The PRIME Standard has been successfully analyzed with security
in mind, examining its details and striving to find points that still
pose a risk in any new scenario where the protocol is put into place
in a network. Reporting has taken place dividing potential threats
according to the style of attack, first covering passive interventions all
the way to active traffic injections with diverse malicious and harmful
intentions in mind until our attack style of choice.
The most vulnerable mechanisms from a DoS point-of-view con-
tained in the standard have been highlighted, including Security Pro-
file 0 usage for communications, node registration mechanisms and
Base Node weaknesses.
While this analysis is limited by the style of attack in place, positive
results have come out of the study, although leaving plenty of space
for improvement as well as attack design.
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Again, designing threats for a full implementation of a Smart Grid
network running PRIME is subjected by the decision to focus on De-
nial of Service-type of attacks. However, even with this conditions, an
adequate structure and planning has been shown in order to create
up to four design and implementation plans for attacks with relative
expectations of success.
Tackling the most vulnerable sections of the standard has led to two
attacks focusing on the Node Registration mechanisms of PRIME, the
first one harming the process by overflowing Node Identifiers and
the second one detailing the mechanism to impersonate correctly-
working nodes in order to hijack their position. Afterwards, another
two offensive mechanisms came up by overflowing the use of the
LSID field by overcomplicating the topological structure of the net-
work, first, and then spoofing Base Node to create harm in a network
combining two strategies shown in the study section of the thesis.
5.2 future work
Despite the completed objectives of this study, several points have
been left to be done along the lines of this project to further expand
over its work.
Initially, the idea as how far this study could go did not consider
theoretical developments and analysis, and aspired to create a real
attacking environment over a functioning Smart Grid system.
As exposed in various occasions during this thesis, the possibility
to experiment with a real-life environment of a PRIME Smart Grid
network is, at least, limited, if not only available to manufacturers.
This, together with the realization that much study of the standard on
the authors’ part was pending before any attack could be successfully
designed, shifted the focus of this project towards the study that is
now.
Therefore, if this work were to be continued, it would complete
these aspects of the total idea left unexplored. This is, once the de-
tailed study of the standard is finished and the attack implementa-
tions are design adequately, use the tools available to create a simula-
tion of a PRIME network in which to test out these mechanics.
Detailed previously is the setup used in UC3M for this kind of ex-
periments, which uses a semi-simulated environment but still counts
with PRIME Nodes and concentrators to work with. These elements
are the ones this study could not count on
If such elements had been available physically or in a software fully-
simulated environment, the study would have gone forward to try
out the designed attacks. This work would have attempted to create a
"lack of service" situation for the simulated working PRIME network,
testing its resistance to DoS attacks with the harmful implementations
detailed in the last part of the current study.
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The cyber-physical infrastructure for the attack would be the same
as explained here, where a malicious host connects to the last mile of
the Smart Grid (meters). There, it would effectively inject the needed
traffic in order to create the desired effect.
The use of a packet crafting tool (Scapy) could have been employed
to create PRIME-like frames to insert into the network via, for in-
stance, a pcap interface. Later, using a network sniffing application
such as Wireshark, connected between the attacking host and the
victim nodes, we could obtain the readings and packet traces cor-
responding to the attack to effectively certificate it has taken place
and the network has been taken down.
If a complete implementation of a simulated environment were
to take place in the context of this work, a realistic simulation of a
PRIME-based PLC architecture would need the inclusion of physi-
cal phenomena, channel attenuation, multi-path effects and packets
of variable length. This last feature would need a set of Matlab cal-
culation tools, as it is the case with similar simulations taking this
into account. The use of OMNeT++ network simulation is valuable
when modeling the telematic effects of the communication process.
Finally, the implementation of DLMS/COSEM as application layer is
necessary for complementing the specification of PRIME.
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